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BEYOND STATE INTERVENTION
IN THE FAMILY: FOR BABY JANE
DOE
Martha Minow*
Newspapers and broadcasters gave major billing to the story.
Headlines announced: "The Life or Death Question of Baby
Doe;" and "Baby Doe's Parents Call U.S. Action Intimidating." 1
The medical care decisions about this infant born with spina
bifida, microcephaly, and other severe disabilities,2 not only attracted mass media attention, but also led to both state and federal court proceedings. Legislative hearings raised the issue of
her care. Many commentators debated what should happen to
this infant of Long Island parents. 3 This article instead will ask:
what was all the attention about?; why are cases like this so riveting?; and might the reasons for public fascination and anguish
illuminate alternative legal responses?
Several themes dominated public discussion of the Baby Jane
Doe case: first, the scope of the parents' legal and moral rights to
refuse surgery to enclose the spine of their child born with spina
bifida and other conditions; second, the role of a person with no
relationship to the family who challenged the parents' decision
in both state and federal courts; and finally, the reach of governmental power to obtain information about the child's medical
condition and to review the parents' decisions about their child's
• Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School. A.B., 1975, University of Michigan;
Ed.M., 1976, Harvard University; J.D., 1979, Yale Law School.
The author thanks Sarah Walzer, Zipporah Wiseman, Lloyd Weinreb, Alan Stone, Avi
Soifer, Joe Singer, David Shapiro, Lewis Sargentich, Frances Olsen, Robert Mnookin,
Jay Katz, Louis Kaplow, Philip Heymann, Marsha Garrison, Mary Joe Frug, Chai Feld·blum, Ken Chesebro, David Chambers, Stephen Carter, Katharine Bartlett, Judith
Areen, and Bruce Ackerman for their generous and wise counsel.
1. Detroit Free Press, Nov. 11, 1983, at Bl; N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1984, § I, at 45.
2. See infra text accompanying note 8 (explaining these conditions).
3. See, e.g., Hentoff, Come Sweet Death and Judge Baby's Quality of Life, VILLAGE
VOICE, Mar. 27, 1984, at 6; Margolick, Battle for 'Baby Doe,; N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1983,
at BL Public debates were held about the case. See, e.g., Chambers, Specialists Debate
the Issues in Baby Doe Case, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1983, § 1, at 63, col. 1 (debate sponsored by nonprofit agency); see also Curran, Quality of Life and Treatment Decisions:
The Canadian Law Reform Report, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 297 (1984) (relating Doe case
to reform efforts); Kuzma, The Legislative Response to Infant Doe, 59 IND. L.J. 377
(1984) (discussing legal response to earlier case of Down's syndrome baby in Indiana).
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medical care. Each of these themes poses a question concerning
the relationship between the state and the family. Can parents
count on the state to secure for them a sphere of private decision making about their child's medical care? Can a stranger to
the family ask the courts to review parents' medical care decisions about their child? Can the government itself initiate such
review, and supplant the parents' choice? Central to all these
questions lies the problem commonly termed "state intervention
in the family." Baby Jane Doe's case is an emblem of this controversial legal issue.
Thus, the case seems a prime candidate for analysis in this
Symposium on state intervention in the family. This article begins by examining arguments over state intervention in the context of legal developments arising around Baby Jane Doe, but it
then identifies the conceptual ambiguity and emotional complexity that permit debates on these issues to continue without
resolution. The article then rejects the framework of "state intervention" by showing that arguments cast in those terms overlook the variety of possible forms and directions of state intervention, and obscure the inevitable role of the state in any
possible allocation of power to decide the infant's medical
treatment.
Further, this article demonstrates how vociferous exchanges
over the substantive and procedural choices for the state produce a polarized set of alternatives that fail to express the positions people actually wish to take, much less the complexity of
the problem. Rigid and polarized alternatives do not contribute
to solutions, and instead express and deepen distrust among potential decisionmakers. Yet the polarized structure of the debates seems to tap conflicting parts of the human psyche and, in
particular, conflicts for each individual over identifying with and
separating from others. This article maintains that more productive problem solving would emerge by addressing these very
sources of conflict and developing approaches that acknowledge
both the experiences of separateness and of connection that underlie people's responses to cases like Baby Jane Doe's.
As initial steps in this direction, the article proposes processes
for decision that: (1) emphasize the obligations of both the state
and the family in the continuing care of the infant; (2) provide
for exchanges of information in nonadversarial settings to improve estimates of the experiential meaning of the child's medical condition and the role of the child's caretakers in shaping
that meaning; and (3) promote the development of general treatment guidelines removed from crisis situations and with the par-

SUMMER

1985]

Beyond State Intervention

935

ticipation of medical professionals, political authorities, and
members of the public. These suggestions are not offered as
cures for the problem, but instead as examples of a problemsolving approach that addresses the issues of trust and connection, and distrust and separation in disputes over medical treatment for severely handicapped infants.
These steps will not yield consensus nor will they produce mutual trust. Yet they may frame the problem in forms that challenge preconceptions about the handicapped infant, about the
opponents' positions, and about the decisionmakers' role in the
options available to the infant.
Before suggestions of these sorts can be developed, the prevailing conceptions of the problem must be challenged. Section I
of this article takes on the debate over state intervention by
demonstrating the multiple meanings signified by "state intervention" in the context of actions taken to affect Baby Jane Doe
alone, and rejects the terms of the state intervention debate as
ambiguous and distractingly charged with symbolic meaning.
Section II recasts the problem as a set of both substantive and
procedural choices for the state, and suggests how each of these
choices importantly implicates parents, medical and legal personnel, and the broader society in the prospects of the infant.
Because these interpersonal connections may remain obscured
even when the problem is cast as a set of substantive and procedural choices, the article turns in Section III to reconsider the
problem expressly in terms of psychological notions of distrust
and identification. On the basis of this psychological analysis,
Section III then explores the legal steps that could address
sources of distrust between parents and children, families and
governments, and families and strangers. The article in essence
maintains that deep conflicts about the relationship between the
self and others-and about the power of the community to make
individual lives more or less· meaningful-are implicated in each
decision about medical treatment for a handicapped newborn,
and that failing to acknowledge these conflicts will not help
avoid them. Instead, the article proposes taking such conflicts
seriously as the starting point for making decisions, and adopting strategies that help address both these deep conflicts and the
power of the community implicated in the decisions made about
vulnerable people.
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STATE INTERVENTION: VARIETIES, HOPES, AND FEARS

In an era when the state intervention problem has manifested
itself in such controversial issues as abortion, teen-age contraception, and family violence, framing any given case in terms of
state intervention does not lead to an obvious solution. One's
view about state intervention often depends upon the result one
desires in a particular conflict. For example, amid debates over
Baby Jane Doe, individuals who in other situations argue against
state intervention in the family found themselves urging state
involvement. 4
·
Additionally, state intervention in the family takes various
forms. Intervention in each instance involves the state in monitoring or altering conduct or decisions that would take place
within a family. The medical treatment of Baby Jane Doe occasioned a variety of governmental actions, not simply an either/or
choice about the wisdom of state intervention. This Section examines how the case of Baby Jane Doe illustrates the many
dimensions of "state intervention" and implicates broader controversies about power, the family, and the state. This Section
suggests that the state intervention framework adopted by both
legal and media debate is unhelpful, because it fails to correspond to the variety of choices involved in a case like Baby Jane
Doe's, and because it expresses but does not explore deep
sources of distrust about the family and the state.

A.

Varieties of State Intervention

When people argue about whether the state should intervene
in family decisions about infant medical care, they could mean
any one of a combination of governmental actions. As a result,
arguments cast as a dichotomous choice between "state intervention" and "nonintervention" are misleading and confusing.
Once the government has the authority to intervene which it
may or may not exercise-and, indeed, the authority to consider
its own authority to intervene-the idea of state intervention
4. See Hentoff, They're Putting Babies on Death Row in Oklahoma, VILLAGE VOICE,
May 1, 1984, at 8 (discussing civil rights lawyer Martin Gerry). See generally Biklin &
Ferguson, In the Matter of Baby Jane Doe: Does Reagan Really Agree with Us?, Soc.
PoL'Y, Summer 1984, at 5, (discussing ironic alliances and strange bedfellows); Hentoff,
The Awful Privacy of Baby Doe, ATL. MONTHLY, Jan. 1985, at 54, 56 [hereinafter cited as
Hentoff, The Awful Privacy of Baby Doe]. Here and elsewhere, the debate rests on an
oversimplified conception of "state." See infra text accompanying note 44 and note 148.
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fails to have a sharp edge. Debates over medical treatment decisions, however, identify particular governmental powers that
could be exercised as instances of state intervention to be challenged or justified. Yet the very variety of governmental powers
that could be exercised in a given case, like Baby Jane Doe's,
blurs the notion of state intervention as an either/or proposition.
Given the legal actions surrounding Baby Jane Doe alone, the
meaning of state intervention in medical care decisions made by
parents of disabled infants includes: (1) state judicial availability
for challenges under parens patriae power or state child protection statutes; (2) federal judicial review of whether existing law
governing the disabled applies; 11 (3) initiation of federal regulatory action to require new procedures within health care institutions; (4) enactment of new legislation, whether triggered by
federal agencies or undertaken independently by state governments. Governmental involvement can take place at both the
state and federal level, and can work through legislative, executive, and judicial action. 6
All these options could share a direction; all could make it
more difficult for parents and their own physicians to determine
the treatment for a disabled newborn. In the current debate, the
argument against state intervention seems to claim this substantive outcome: intervention by the state is opposed in order to
secure private choice-making room for parents and doctors. Yet
the techniques of governmental activity alleged to threaten this
realm of private choice could also be used to enlarge parental
and physician choice. In the instance of Baby Jane Doe, this va5. Even if the result of the review is a finding that the governing law does not apply,
the act of judicial review itself "intervenes" and indeed incurs costs in terms of time,
money, and emotional drain. See Chambers, Baby Doe: Hard Case for Parents and
Courts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1984, § 21, at 1, col. 1 (noting that Doe's parents incur
$36,000 costs in legal fees); Chambers, Parents of 'Baby Doe' Criticized 'Intrusion' by
U.S., N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at L45, col. 2. The reviewing court in the Baby Jane Doe
case combined its own independent assessment of whether the parents' medical decision
was "in the best interest of the infant" with a conclusion that because the decision was
in the infant's best interests, "there is no basis for judicial intervention." Weber v. Stony
Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587,589,467 N.Y.S.2d 686,687, aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d
1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983). Intervention, in this sense,
must mean judicial supplanting of the parents' decision rather than the exercise of judicial power to assess whether to supplant the parents' choice. Other meanings of intervention are also possible. See also text accompanying note 52.
6. A form of government intervention may also occur when the government itself
asks whether it has the authority "to intervene"-that very inquiry involves government
action of some sort. See infra section II. Governmental power to -determine its own
power is a standard bootstrap and also a self-monitoring device. Cf. United States v.
United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (every court has capacity to determine
its own power to hear the case before it).
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riety of strategies for state intervention comes together in one
vivid case study.
At the heart of this case was a set of disagreements over the
facts of ihe condition that Baby Jane Doe manifested at birth,
and related disagreements over the meanings of those conditions. Press critics disputed the facts initially reported in news
stories about Baby Doe. 7 As initially reported in the major newspapers, Baby Jane Doe at birth had multiple medical problems,
including an opening of the bones and coverings of the spinal
cord, known as spina bifida; an abnormally small head, known as
microcephaly; and an accumulation of fluid in the cranial regions, known as hydrocephalus. Doctors told her parents. that
Baby Jane Doe "probably had brain malfunction" and that "the
part of the brain that controls much of our awareness was either
missing or not entirely formed." 8 After lengthy consultation with
medical, religious, and social work professionals, her parents
chose to decline the option of surgery to close the spinal opening; they approved other measures to respond to the infant's
conditions. Perhaps, given a different set of descriptions of her
conditions and her prognosis, Baby Jane Doe's parents would
have decided differently. As other private and public actors entered the case through a range of intervention strategies, ea~h
brought their construction of the facts to decisions about the
infant.
1. State judicial review- Within two weeks of Baby Jane
Doe's birth, the state trial court in Suffolk County, New York,
agreed to hear a challenge to the parents' choice of medical
treatment for the infant, 9 and authorized a guardian ad litem to
consent to surgical procedures on the infant's behalf. 10 This action represented several kinds of state involvement. First, the
state permitted a person unconnected to the family to invoke
state judicial power to review the parents' decision about the in- ·
7. See Baer, The Half-Told Story of Baby Jane Doe, CoLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov.Dec. 1984, at 35 (criticizing press coverage for overly pessimistic estimates of infant's
prognosis); Hentoff, A Case of Deformed Journalism at 60 Minutes, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr.
3, 1984, at 6 (same); see also infra note 57.
8. Chambers, Parents of 'Baby Doe' Criticize 'Intrusion' by U.S., N.Y. Times, Nov.
6, 1983, at L45, col. 2.
9. A. Lawrence Washburn, a resident of Vermont who had no relationship with the
New York family of Baby Jane Doe, initiated the lawsuit. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp.,
60 N.Y.2d 208, 211, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64, cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1026 (1983). Washburn had also initiated or intervened in many prior lawsuits involving
abortions. Chambers, Advocates for the Right to Life, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1984, § 6
(Magazine) at 94, 97, 100.
10. See Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 211, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187, 469
N.Y.S.2d 63, 64 (1983).
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fant's treatment. 11 Second, the state appointed someone other
than the parents to stand as guardian for the infant. Third, the
state authorized that guardian to consent to surgery for the
child but did not authorize the guardian to reiterate the parents'
decision to forego surgery. The trial court used the notion of
state intervention to mean an opportunity for judicial review of
the parents' decision, and to mean judicial authority to supersede the parents' decision through an appointed guardian.
When Baby Doe's parents appealed the trial court decision,
the appellate division endorsed the notion that courts have
parens patriae power to review parents' choices about medical
care for their children. The court nonetheless rejected the exercise of state intervention to supersede the parents' decisions in
the Baby Jane Doe case. The court concluded that the parents'
refusal of surgery did not constitute a decision to bring about
the child's death, as no imminent risk of death absent the surgery existed. 12 The appellate court's opinion itself highlighted
the equivocal meanings of state intervention. The court stated
that it found "no basis for judicial intervention" even though
the court itself intervened by interposing its judgment, independently reviewing the record, and finding the parents' determination "to be in the best interest of the infant. " 13 The appellate
division also implicitly affirmed the power of the trial court to
hear a challenge brought by a private person unrelated to the
family.
The initiation of legal proceedings by someone unrelated to
the family formed the basis for the decision of the New York
Court of Appeals on review. 14 The Court of Appeals reasoned
that the petitioner had no direct interest in the medical treatment of the infant because he had no direct relationship to the
infant; therefore, the trial court should not have entertained pe11. Nonrelatives are commonly authorized or even obliged to become involved in
family health problems through state child abuse and neglect reporting requirements
placed on teachers, doctors, and other professionals who routinely encounter children.
See generally R. GoTIESMAN, THE CHILD AND THE LAW 42-43 (1981) (reporting statutes).
The premise of such requirements is that such individuals have some relationship with
the child or some professional obligation to guard against risks to children. The person
permitted to initiate judicial review of the decision by Baby Jane Doe's parents did not
fall within these categories, and did not act under authorization from a child neglect
reporting statute, but claimed a sense of obligation to the infant from afar.
12. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686-87, aff'd,
60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983).
13. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686-87, a/f'd,
60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983).
14. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63,
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983).
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titioner's suit. The court did acknowledge that the state Department of Social Services properly could have invoked review of
the parents' decision by the state judiciary. As the state agency
did not take this route, the state judiciary did not belong in the
medical care decision. 111 Accordingly, the highest state court limited the power of the state judiciary to cases brought by the
state bureaucracy rather than by a private person with no rela- .
tionship to the family. 16 And the New York state court identified
the state Department of Social Services as the avenue for state
governance of family affairs. 17
2. Federal judicial review- Another form of state intervention arose with federal action in the case. The federal government entered the fray when the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) filed suit in federal district court against
the hospital treating Baby Jane Doe under the federal statute
prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped, section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 18 The federal court accepted
the suit as a proper invocation of federal judicial authority
under the statute, but rejected the agency's claim because the
government failed to establish that the hospital violated the
statute and discriminated against a handicapped person. 19 The
court additionally concluded that section 504 did not authorille
the federal government to force the hospital to release its
15. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63,
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983).
16. The court neither precluded nor invited suits initiated by other family members,
nor did the court define who, in addition to a parent, has "direct interest" in such a case.
The court expressly identified only the state child protection agency as entitled to initiate judicial proceedings to challenge parental judgments: "All other persons and entities
may only file a petition if directed to do so by the court." Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp.,
60 N.Y.2d 208, 212, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64. The court additionally
warned that any contrary rule permitting others to initiate judicial action in this context
would "challenge the most private and most precious responsiblity vested in the parents
for the care and nurture of their children-and at the very least to force the parents to
incur the not inconsiderable expenses of extended litigation." Id. at 213, 456 N.E.2d at
1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
17. See infra text accompanying note 34 (describing action taken by N. Y. Department of Social Services).
18. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (invoking
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)),
aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3040 (Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 841529).
19. The court reasoned that the hospital declined to perform surgery on the infant
not due to discrimination against a handicapped person, but due to her parents' refusal
to consent to surgery; the court also concluded that the parents' refusal was reasonable.
United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 614-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (invoking
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)),
aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3040 (Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 841529).
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records to the agency or the court. 20 And the court denied standing to sue to the individual who initiated the state court suit for
the appointment of a guardian for Baby Jane Doe. 21
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion but rephrased the issue to
consider whether section 504 even reached the situation of a parental medical treatment decision for a disabled newborn. 22 The
court examined the terms of the statute, which forbid recipients
of federal funds from denying to any "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" any benefits of any program receiving federal
assistance, and also prohibit discrimination against such persons
by these programs. 23 Finding any application of this language to
the medical treatment of an infant less than clear, the court concluded that Congress did not intend the statute to deal with the
issue raised in the case of Baby Jane Doe, and affirmed the district court's denial of the Department's claim.u
20. The court approved the government's intervention given its interest in federal
funds received by the hospital, but the court found no reason to grant access to the
infant's medical records to the government, under the facts of the case. United States v.
University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 613-14, 616 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (invoking the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)), aff'd, 729 F.2d
144 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3040 (Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 84-1529).
21. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 610, 613-14, 616 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (invoking the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
794 (1982)), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3040 (Aug. 6,
1985) (No. 84-1529).
22. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 54
U.S.L.W. 3040 (Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 84-1529).
23. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3040 (Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 84-1529).
24. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 154-55, 156-61 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3040 (Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 84-1529). Both courts' reasoning
rests on solid ground. The language of § 504 itself gives no authority for federal review of
parental decisions about medical treatment for their severely disabled infants. Parents
are not governed by the Act, which prohibits discrimination "under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). The government
itself has conceded that parents are not covered by § 504. 49 Fed. Reg. 1631 (1984). And
it is the parents' decision, not the hospital's or health care providers'-that determines
whether medical treatment will be pursued or foregone. Discrimination under § 504 also
is an ill-suited rubric to make sense of the complicated medical treatment decisions
made by parents. Nor does § 504 authorize federal review of whether health care personnel are fulfilling their state law obligations to report or otherwise respond to instances of
child neglect. Indeed, such an interpretation would convert § 504 into a master key to
open all state law enforcement practices to federal scrutiny on the issue of
discrimination.
Should there be any ambiguity in the meaning of § 504 in this context, it should not
be resolved to authorize greater federal control of the traditional areas of state concern:
family law and regulation of medicine. The 1984 Amendments of the Child Abuse Act
acknowledge as much in establishing a federal program that relies on state law and state
law enforcement in these areas. See 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878, 14,879 (Apr. 15, 1985) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340). See also Letter from Senator Hatch to Senator Weicker,
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Under this analysis, the HHS wrongly invoked the power of
the federal court because the statute asserted to authorize federal involvement did not govern the case. The court thereby removed section 504 from possible bases for invoking the power of
the federal courts to review parental medical care decisions. New
federal regulatory activity under the statute undoubtedly will alter the course of future litigation. 25
3. Federal regulatory action- The Second Circuit decision
collided with an ongoing effort by HHS to regulate medical
treatment for disabled newborns through administrative action.
HHS began this effort in 1982 after an earlier Baby Doe case. A
Down's syndrome infant died in Indiana in 1982 after the parents declined to consent to surgery to remedy a malformed
esophagus and to allow the hospital to provide nutrition to the
infant. 26 Responding to public criticism from handicapped rights
and right to life groups, President Reagan instructed the Secretary of HHS to notify health care providers that section 504 governed the treatment of handicapped patients. 27 HHS in turn notified 7,000 hospitals of this requirement, and later issued
130 Cong. Rec. 12392 (Sept. 28, 1984) ("Throughout the statutory language and accompanying explanatory material, we refer to authority under state law as the mechanism
for pursuing legal remedies under our amendment. This legislation does not itself authorize direct federal involvement in individual cases."). Federal hearings about alleged
discrimination in parental treatment decisions thus have neither authority nor guidance
from the language or legislative history of § 504, or from the traditional allocation of
power between the federal and state government in these areas. Especially given the
complexity and contest.ability of treatment decisions for severely handicapped newborns,
this hardly seems a wise occasion for straining to invent new interpretations of federal
discrimination law.
25. New rules announced by the Department of Health and Human Services (a) add
a new definition of "withholding medically indicated treatment" and new exceptions to
the definition, see infra note 77; (b) detail the state child protective programs that must
be in place before a state may obtain federal support under the statute; (c) provide
model guidelines to encourage the development of Infant Care Review committees. Office
of Human Development Services, Department of Health and Human Services, Child
Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 50 Fed. Reg.14,878, 14,893 (Apr.
15, 1985) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340). Some have argued that the proposed
regulations violated the terms of the compromise struck in the governing statute, see id.
at 14,879 (reporting comments on proposed rule, including objections by sponsors of the
legislation) but the final rules eliminate most terms giving rise to such comments. Litigation challenging the regulations is foreseeable. Still, since the final version of the regulation treats much of its interpretive language simply as guides rather than binding rules
of law, id. at 14,880, the courts can hew closely to the language of the statute itself.
26. Kuzma, supra note 3, at 378-79; see Lyon, Playing God in the Nursery, REDBOOK,
Jan. 1985, at 112 (describing background of the Indiana Doe case).
27. 49 Fed. Reg. 1622-23 (1984) (detailing history). Republicans interested in a conservative social agenda claim credit for this regulatory effort. See Bird, U.S. Role in
'Baby Doe' Case Defended by Surgeon General, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1983, at B4, col. 3);
Chambers, supra note 9, at 97-100, 105.
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regulations that required health care providers receiving federal
funds to post large signs in public view warning that discriminatory treatment of disabled newborns violated section 504, and
that any observer should report suspected violations to a telephone hotline maintained by HHS. 28 Calls made to the hotline
triggered federal investigations. 29 Presumably, if an investigation
produced a finding of a violation of section 504, the Department
could move to terminate federal funds to the offending facility. 30
After a federal district court ruled the HHS regulations invalid on procedural grounds, 31 HHS proceeded to reissue the
regulations with a few changes. 32 The final version of the rule
responded to comments from groups like the American Academy
of Pediatrics. As a result, the rule encouraged the use of Infant
Care Review Committees within the health care facilities, although HHS refused to allow such committees to substitute for
a continued federal presence through the hotline and
investigations. 33
28. 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983) (interim final rule). The revised final rule requires notice
that "[d]iscriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped infants in this facility is
prohibited by federal law. Any person having knowledge that a handicapped infant is
being discriminatory (sic) denied food or customary medical care should immediately
contact: Handicapped Infant Hotline . . . . " 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1625 (1984).
29. In issuing the final version of its section rule, HHS summarized the cases it had
handled by that time; most either had resulted in findings of no legal violation or were
closed administratively due to insufficient complaint. 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1642-43 (1984).
30. Chambers, Federal District Judge Dismisses U.S. Bid for Handicapped Records,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1983, at 1, col 4. The government also asserted it could terminate
funds if the hospital failed to turn over the baby's medical records. Chambers, A Legal
Knot in Baby Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1983, at Bl, col. 5. The federal district court,
however, rejected the government's request for records. United States v. University
Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3040 (Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 84-1528).
31. The American Academy of Pediatrics challenged the regulations in federal district court as arbitrary and capricious, and on the ground that HHS erroneously issued
the regulations without affording opportunity for advance notice and public comment on
proposed regulations as mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551
(1976). Federal District Judge Gerhardt Gessell accepted these challenges, and criticized
the regulations on the merits as showing the shallow consideration behind the agency
rule; the decision declared the entire interim final rule invalid. American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 399-400 (D.D.C. 1983). In dicta, the opinion
speculated on the applicability of section 504 and the Constitution. See American Academy of Pediatrics, 561 F. Supp. at 401-03.
32. The required sign was smaller and could be posted in view of authorized medical
personnel only instead of in public areas in the health care facilities. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55
(1984). Again HHS relied on section 504 as authority for the rules, but this time the
agency made the regulations available for comment in proposed form before issuing final
and effective rules.
33. Boyd, U.S. Is Easing Rules on Birth-Defect Infants, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1984, at
24, col. 1. HHS received some 17,000 comments on the proposed regulations. Chambers,
Broad Effects Expected From Case of Baby Doe, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1983, at B2, col.
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In summary, the federal agency sought to establish a direct
federal review of medical treatment decisions for disabled
newborns in addition to the state governmental involvement
through parens patriae judicial review or state agency action. 34
Yet the federal regulation again proved short-lived; a federal
district court struck it down as exceeding the scope of section
504. The court relied expressly on the Second Circuit's decision
a few months earlier in the Baby Jane Doe case. 35
4. Federal and state legislation- Still another federal response to the Baby Jane Doe case, and others like it, came in
September, 1984, when both the Senate and House of Representatives agreed on an amendment to an appropriations program intended to combat child abuse and neglect. 36 The amendment added a requirement that states receiving federal grants
under the program authorize state child protective agencies to
pursue legal remedies to prevent the withholding of "medically
indicated treatment from disabled infants with life-threatening
conditions. " 37
4.

34. State agency action did occur finally for Baby Jane Doe; New York State authorities concluded a week and a half after the New York Court of Appeals decision that the
Department of Social Services had no basis to intervene in the matter. United States v.
University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1984). State intervention again was given
two meanings: the authority for an investigation of a parental decision, which the state
did assert, and the exercise of that authority to seek a judicial review of the parental
decision, which the agency declined to do here.
35. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The
district court declined to assess the effect of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), which ruled that federal antidiscrimination requirements associated with federal grants apply only to the programs directly
funded by those grants rather than to the entire institution surrounding those programs.
36. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984). The
President signed the bill into law on Oct. 9, 1984. See 42 U.S.L.W. 5101.
37. Pub. L. No. 98-457, § 122(3), 98 Stat. 1749 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)).
Congress defined "withholding of medically indicated treatment" as:
the failure to respond to the infant's life-threatening conditions by providing
treatment (including appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication) which, in
the treating physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, will be most
likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all such conditions, except
that the term does not include the failure to provide treatment (other than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medication) to an infant when, in the treating
physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, (A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose; (B) the provision of such treatment would (i)
merely prolong dying, (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the
infant's life-threatening conditions, or (iii) otherwise be futile in terms of the
survival of the infant; or (C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually
futile in terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such
circumstances would be inhumane.
§ 121(3). Congress ·also required each state participating in the grants program to establish methods for coordinating and consulting with individuals designated within the
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This enactment represents an elaborate version of the final
method of governmental involvement, legislation, for here federal legislation seeks to produce state legislation. The child
abuse amendment makes federal moneys available to states on
the condition that the states undertake legal enforcement of
standards established by the federal government to monitor the
medical treatment decisions made by parents and their
physicians. 38
Thus, state and federal judicial, legislative, and regulatory activity each constituted avenues for "state intervention" in the
case of Baby Jane Doe. This range of possibilities is obscured by
rhetoric favoring or opposing state intervention. Yet the simplistic state intervention argument carries intense commitment and
makes opponents appear irreconcilable. Such intensity and antagonism over state intervention in the family, I will suggest, exhealth care facilities, and notifying these individuals of suspected instances of medical
neglect. The Act's requirements for infants specifically apply only to children under one
year of age, but Congress also indicated that changes of care should not occur after a
child passes that age. Regulations developed under the amendments elaborate these requirements and also include a model for hospital infant care review committees. See 50
Fed. Reg. 14,878-901. These provisions are discussed infra at text accompanying notes 77
and 138.
38. Any argument that this federal requirement might violate the autonomy of the
states seems effectively eliminated with the Supreme Court decision overruling National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). In Garcia, the Court ruled that any substantive restraint
on the federal government's power under the commerce clause stems not from asserted
spheres of state autonomy, but instead from the procedural nature of constitutional limitations. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1020-21. Although family law has traditionally fallen within
the domain of state sovereign power, the Garcia ruling suggests that this notion of traditional state sovereign powers would not place substantive limits on federal congressional
power exercised under the commerce clause. Moreover, the increasing constitutionalization of family law matters undermines the claim that the states alone govern domestic
relations. Further, even under National League of Cities, states which chose to take
moneys from the federal government subject to conditions like the enactment of state
laws advancing specified federal aims may well have been bound to fulfill those conditions, despite any claims of state autonomy.
In any case, state statutory authority may be used to pursue directly the monitoring of
parental medical treatment decisions, even absent federal pressure. Three states have
already enacted laws that specifically deal with deprivation of care to newborns: ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (Supp. 1984-85) (requiring medical personnerto report to the
state if they have reasonable grounds to believe there has been a denial or deprivation of
necessary medical care, surgery, or nourishment with intent to cause or allow death of a
child); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 40:1299.36.1 (West Supp. 1985) (forbidding denial of nutrition, water, or oxygen with intent to cause or allow the death of a child, but not requiring
medical or surgical care when child's parent or parents along with physicians conclude
that potential risks outweigh potential benefits of treatment); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3212 (Purdon 1983) (requiring customary infant medical care for any infant born alive).
See also Feldman & Murray, State Legislation and the Handicapped Newborn: A Moral
and Political Dilemma, LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE, Sept. 1984, at 156-63 (criticizing
state statutes for sloppiness and faulty assumptions).
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presses broader issues. What is at stake is not just the merits of
arguments over state intervention, but deeper attitudes about
the meanings and consequences of basic legal and political
arrangements. 39
B.

Intervention: Hopes and Fears

As a first effort to see beneath the surface of debates over a
case like Baby Jane Doe's, it is worth asking what beliefs underlie arguments about the merits of state intervention into the
family, distinct from arguments about the merits of the medical
treatment question. Debates about governmental intervention in
other issues of family law illuminate this question. Pro-choice
advocates in the abortion debate consistently argue for freedom
from state intervention in the private decision made by a woman
in consultation with her doctor. 40 Legal and political debate concerning a minor's freedom to have an abortion focuses on claims
that the state should require notification to the teen's parents
before she may elect an abortion. 41 Contraception and new procreative technologies implicate similar questions. 42 Violence in
the family, notably child and spouse abuse, have garnered public
and legislative attention, but controversy continues over when
39. Similar debates over governmental intervention occupy the attention of scholars
and policy makers concerned with state action in the context of federal constitutional
law, and also governmental regulation of the marketplace and the workplace. See
Friendly, The Public/Priuate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982). State intervention in the areas of family and sexuality may be opposed by the very people who favor it
in the context of economic regulation and labor relations; similarly, those who oppose
governmental involvement in the economy may favor it in the context of family and
sexuality, see Mnookin, The Public/Priuate Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429, 1430-34 (1982). At work in these debates
are deep disagreements over visions of society, virtue, and justice, rather than disagreements over the issue of state intervention per se.
40. See K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 98-100 (1984).
41. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (ruling, over dissent, that notification
requirement is constitutional for dependent, immature minor living with parents). Federal and state regulatory efforts to impose parental notification requirements for minors
seeking abortions or access to contraceptives have triggered controversies. Note, Unemancipated Minors' Rights of Access to Contraceptiues Without Parental Consent or
Notice-The Squeal Rule and Beyond, 8 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 219 (1982); See Comment, The Distribution of Contraceptiues to Unemancipated Minors: Does a Parent
Haue a Constitutional Right to be Notified?, 69 Kv. L.J. 436 (1980-81). Certainly, such
notification requirements would put some minors at risk of interference or rejection by
their parents. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 425, 437-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42. See generally Note, Reproductiue Technology and the Procreation Rights of the
Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669 (1985) (discussing state rules governing access to new
reproductive technologies and related constitutional protections).
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the state should intervene. 43
In all of these areas, advocates sometimes treat state intervention as an intrinsic evil that jeopardizes norms of freedom, autonomy, and intimacy. At other times, participants in public debate cast state intervention as an important force for good,
necessary to protect the weak from private oppression and to
ensure justice. In a profound sense, the state can be seen as both
a force for good and evil. Yet the passions of public debate seem
to lead people to emphasize one view and suppress the other.
The particular policy context rather than consistent political
philosophy appears to determine when a given group approves
of state intervention; yet each view of state intervention invokes
a contrasting picture of family and family law.
1. The family-A haven of love and respect- One view
identifies the family as a cherished enclave, removed from the
hustle and cruelty of the marketplace, the impersonal treatment
of the state, and the intolerances of majorities. In this view of
the family, love and affection, rather than rules, govern; authority should be trusted, not regulated; the powerful have the interests of the powerless at heart; members share property free from
the marketplace rules of exchange; and sex between spouses is
love and legal. Under this view of the family, the law should
keep the state out of the family as much as possible and should
shield the family from "state intervention.""" State control of
43. Child abuse legislation may have resolved most of the controversy over state incursion in the family sphere in this area by treating abuse as a medical issue and as an
instance of individual deviance. See B. NELSON, MAKING AN IssuE OF CHILD ABUSE: POLITICAL AGENDA SETTING FOR Soc1AL PROBLEMS 17-19 (1984). Nonetheless, critics charge the
state with overintrusiveness and arbitrary state intrusion under vague child abuse statutes. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
16-18 (1979). Resistance to state intervention in spouse abuse matters may persist even
after state legislatures adopt statutes authorizing state action: police, prosecutors, and
clerks still resist the use of the state apparatus to deal with this problem in the family.
See Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (citing police's
and clerks' failures to process charges of spouse abuse), rev'd, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407
N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979);
DeRenzo & Strawn, Development of Policy for the Middlesex County District Attorney
in the Area of Family Violence: Sentencing Guidelines and the Need for a Systematic
Approach (Mar. 22, 1985) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.)
(substantiating that police tend not to make arrests, clerks dissuade women from filing
complaints).
44. See- Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1501, 1504-08 (1983). Yet from another perspective, this same
conception entails state ratification of particular family forms and family relationships.
Id. The risk of analysis of this sort is its tendency to treat complex, human interactions
as simplified abstract concepts like "family" and "state." Because this simplification
characterizes much popular and legal analysis, I explore it in its own terms, infra text
accompanying note 148.
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how families live violates the purpose of the democratic order,
which aims to constrain state tyranny and to promote private
freedoms. 45 The law, consequently, should guard families from
public intrusions in parents' special authority over decisions
about conceiving and raising children. Similarly, the law should
shield families from strangers or governmental authorities who
might challenge family members' decisions about abortion, discipline, and styles of living. In sum, risks of state abuse pose
greater dangers than risks of abuse within the family.
2. The family-a hell of oppression and brutality- A second view portrays the family as a center of oppression, raw will
and authority, violence and brutality, where the powerful economically and sexually subordinate and exploit the powerless. 46
45. See P. BERGER & E. BERGER, THE WAR OVER THE FAMILY (1983). One traditional
view conceived of the family as the arena of mutual benevolence and moral commitment,
where concerns about rights and justice were virtually irrelevant. See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 31, 33-34 (1982) (discussing Hume); M. WALZER,
SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 227 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JusTICE) (describing a view of family as beyond the reach of
distributive justice, though threatened by the state and market). A modern version of
this view identifies the psychological needs of the children as a reason to limit state
intervention and assure parental autonomy. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT,
supra note 43, at 9-12. To some extent, contemporary constitutional law embodies this
commitment to treat family relations as nurturing and conflict-free in order to promote
such relationships, free from external control. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603
(1979) ("The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess
what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment . . . . More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in
the best interests of their children."); Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 SuP.
CT. REV. 329, 343 (discussing Supreme Court assumption of harmony between parental
and children's interests).
A related conception treats the family as refuge from the public world, but a refuge
increasingly intruded upon by professionals and social service agencies. See C. LASCH,
HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD xxiii-xxiv, 165-66, 172-73 (1979); W. MCWILLIAMS, THE
IDEA OF FRATERNITY IN AMERICA 193, 469 (1973). A contrasting, but compatible, interpretation suggests that the family was never a locus for liberalism, but instead embodied the
fading values of an organic society amid the public commitment to "free men and
women, tied together only by their contracts." Walzer, Nervous Liberals, in RADICAL
PRINCIPLES: REFLECTIONS OF AN UNRECONSTRUCTED DEMOCRAT 92, 98 (1980). Rather than
being unregulated, the family under this interpretation is the central locus of moral and
religious socialization and the critical unit for establishing order within the state. See S.
TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 111
(1982). This interpretation supplies a bridge to the second view of the family, as a center
of oppression and domination over its members; the notion of a golden age of stable
family authority itself comes under question here. Elder, Approaches to Social Change
and the Family, in TURNING POINTS: HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS ON THE FAMILY 57 (1978).
46. This view is advanced in efforts to expose the prevalence of the physical and
sexual abuse of women and children. See R. KEMPE & C. KEMPE, CHILD ABusE (1978); F.
RusH, THE BEST KEPT SECRET: SEXUAL ABusE OF CHILDREN (1980); Eisenberg & Micklow,
The Assaulted Wiie: 'Catch 22' Revisited, 3 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 138, 138-39 (1977).
This picture also includes the violent responses of victims to their victimization. See
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Many conclude from this version of the family as hell that law
should protect individual family members from one another.
The state should regulate or preclude parental decisions about
whether children work, learn, drink alcohol, or drive automobiles. Similarly, state officials should scrutinize parental decisions to abort a fetus and to discipline a child. 47 Court orders
should be available to individuals within the family to restrain
other family members from hurting them or denying them their
own freedoms of choice.
I have described the alternative views of the family in stark
and simplistic terms to clarify the hopes and fears underlying
the state intervention debate. Some in the debate seem to fear
the family more than the state and others reverse the order of
fears. Opponents of state intervention in cases like Baby Jane
Doe's argue, in effect, that the family represents a trustworthy
enclave in which, presumptively, decisionmakers act from love
rather than rules. Therefore, the delicate and anguishing decisions about how to care for a disabled or even dying child should
belong to the family. 48 In contrast, advocates of state intervention argue that society should not trust the family to make a
Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623 (1980) (analyzing self-defense claims of battered wives). Recent scholarship also pays attention to the family's oppression of men. See B.
EHRENREICH, THE HEARTS OF MEN (1983). For a masterful argument that the family
forges conceptions of self and sexuality that produce complex patterns of domination,
see Benjamin, Master & Slave: the Fantasy of Erotic Domination, in THE POWERS OF
DESIRE 280-99 (1983) (describing complex patterns of domination in conceptions of self
and sexuality developed within the family). Cf. M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra
note 45, at 235 (emotional tyranny by parents over children intrinsic to sphere of
kinship).
47. See Swedes Outlaw Spanking, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, PARENTAL
AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 70 (1980) (describing Swedish law outlawing all corporal
punishment by parents).
48. Big Brother Doe, Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1983, § 1, at 30, col. 1.
What we most certainly know is that, barring the most extreme circumstances,
we do not want the decision made by some bureaucrat or some coven of lawyers.
The inevitable agony will be much less if these decisions, and any mistakes, are
left to families involved; most often the families will decide on the basis of love,
and in any event, it is the family that must live with the resulting burden or
guilt.
A New York Times editorial based its reasoning on a quotation from the infant's mother:
"We know, [Baby Jane Doe's] mother said, that as she grew older she would always be
an infant. She would never know love. And while she might feel sorrow and joy, her
overall condition would be pain." Baby Jane's Defender, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1983 at
A30, col. 1. The appellate division decision expressly noted that Baby Doe's parents were
"concededly concerned and loving," Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467
N.Y.S.2d 685, aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1026; see also supra text accompanying note 13 (discussing appellate division
decision).
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proper decision about the medical care of a disabled infant because the family is an unruly center of oppression, victimizing
the vulnerable. 49
Yet this initial effort to peer beneath the surface of public debate raises new questions. Why do alternate pictures of family
and state animate public debate? How could anyone latch on to
such simplistic images of family or state, when there are reasons
to trust and distrust both? Perhaps particular understandings of
recent history matter here. The state intervention debate may
express varied responses to a widely shared belief that familial
relationships have changed over the past several centuries. Families are no longer trustworthy, and professionals now serve functions once served by family members. According to this view,
increasing "legalization" of relationships emerges as family
members neglect their duties and as individuals must negotiate
relationships founded in contract to fill human needs. "0 Whether
this shared belief is accurate," 1 people have demanded and created legal solutions to their mounting distrust within social
relationships.
Yet a debate cast as though there is an either/or decision-either the state should intervene or not-may tap into
these sources of distrust about both the family and the state.
Such an either/or debate fails to offer bases for addressing the
sources of distrust and obscures the complexity of family and
state relations. This debate also hides the varied meanings of
state intervention and mistakenly suggests that there can be a
simple answer-yes or no-to the question, should the state intervene. The next Section challenges a fundamental assumption
that state intervention can be avoided and then examines the
conceptual debates that remain after exposing that assumption.
49. A New York Times editorial quotes Dr. Koop as saying, "[i]f we do not intrude
into the life of a child such as this, whose civil rights may be abrogated? The next person
may be you." Raby Jane's Defender, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1983, at A30, col. 1. See also
Biklen & Ferguson, supra note 4, at 4-5 (criticizing those who would subordinate child's
life to family's interests in avoiding burdens of disabled child).
50. See C. LASCH, supra note 45; cf. Neal & Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered: The Case of Special Education, 48 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., 63, 65-89 (1985)
(describing educational relationships as increasingly regulated and due process norms
interposed; legalization has costs and expresses distrust of the practices that would otherwise prevail).
51. The attribution to a prior era of all the longings of the present may well be at
work here. See generally 0. BETIEMANN, THE Gooo OLD DAYS-THEY WERE TERRIBLE
(1974) (using archival materials to expose pain and despair of periods called "the good
old days").
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CHOICES FOR THE STATE

The existence of the competing conceptions of family and
state partially explains the heat in debates over state intervention in the family. People may fundamentally disagree about
their conceptions; people also may be ambivalent and find themselves hotly disagreeing precisely because they can see the power
of the opposing view. The debate concerning the propriety of
state intervention remains futile because both sides of the debate rely on the faulty assumption that state intervention can
ever be avoided. I maintain instead that some degree of state
intervention always exists. The argument is not simply that the
state always has power to assess its own power to intervene, although it is worth noting how this latent state power casts a
shadow over parental decision making. But expressing more
than this latent power, the state always intervenes because it allocates power over the medical care decision, whether it carves
out a sphere of parental autonomy or instead permits strangers
or state officials to challenge and supplant parental decisions. 112
There may be important conceptual differences between and
among state decisions (1) to order medical treatment (or forbid
it), regardless of what parents or doctors would want; (2) to approve or disapprove medical treatment (or nontreatment) as decided by others; or (3) to assign unreviewable decisionmaking
power over the medical decision to others (parents or medical
personnel). Such conceptual distinctions do not capture the actual array of choices in the prevailing legal order which assigns
the medical treatment decision as an initial matter to the parents or guardians, but reserves to the state the power to review
that decision. In essence, then, the current debate focuses on the
52. This point is suggested by David Chambers's observation that "legalization" can
mean both state rules prohibiting and state rules permitting a given human activity;
either position taken by the state amounts to a legal choice. Chambers, The "Legalization" of the Family: Toward a Policy of Supportive Neutrality, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
805, 805 (1985). Even with this recognition, it is still meaningful to discuss the merits of
state decisions to grant greater latitude of choice to family members. See id. at 807.
Of course, a range of political and legal theorists argue that individuals, including parents, enjoy rights prior to and beyond the control of the state, see, e.g., J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix, 113-14 (1974). The
relevance of these claims diminishes, however, given the density of state regulation of
family life, described in the text, and the historical context in which current controversies occur against the backdrop of state-allocated power to parents. General efforts to
define state power over freedom of association-including freedom to form families-underscore the central involvement of state power in regulating such "free" associations. See S. BENN & R. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL TuouGHT 344-49
(1959).
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range of meanings that could be contained within position (2)
above, even though some spokespeople advocate positions
sounding like (1) and (3). If all three options were real possibilities, the state could be more or less directly involved in the activities of ordering, approving, and assigning decisionmaking
power, yet these distinctions do not touch the central point
here-that the state cannot be neutral as to these allocations
and their results.
For example, the state intervenes through child abuse and
neglect statutes and enforcement mechanisms in every state,
even with regard to parents who the state never prosecutes, simply by enacting the laws. Like general criminal statutes that
constitute state regulation even for the law-abiding, such standards of parental duty perpetually subject parents to review by
state officials and induce parents to internalize norms established by the state. The state also controls parents through rules
obliging medical professionals who regularly deal with children
to report to the state evidence of possible abuse or neglect of
child patients by their parents or others. 63 Further, all states interpose public norms about aspects of child care by requiring
attendance at school and regulating work opportunities. 64 The
state licenses marriage, establishes child support obligations,
and imposes sanctions on parents whose children fail to attend
school or run afoul of other laws. 116 Finally, many legal rules sup53. See V. DE FRANCIS, CHILD ABusE LEGISLATION IN THE 1970's 2-10 (1974); Sussman,
Reporting Child Abuse: A Review of the Literature, 8 FAM. L.Q. 245 (1974).
54. For a discussion of the multiple antecendants to state compelled education, see
Tyack, Ways of Seeing: An Essay on the History of Compulsory Schooling, 46 HARV.
EDuc. REV. 355 (1976). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (finding state
authority to compel school attendance, but granting an exception for Amish who claim
compulsory high school attendance undermines their religious way of life); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding state power to compel schooling, but not to
preclude parental choice of private or parochial school). For consideration of state control of child labor, see Marks, Detours on the Road to Maturity: A View of the Legal
Conceptions of Growing Up and Letting Go, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975,
at 78, and Stern, Smith & Doolittle, How Children Used to Work, 39 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1975, at 93, 102-04. See also Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
203, 212, 213 (1982) (restricting child labor).
55. On marriage regulations, see H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 35-36 (1968).
Blackstone described the parental duty of child support as longstanding even when he
wrote. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 446-48. Recent federal
efforts have strengthened and complicated state statutes obliging child support. See, e.g.,
Federal-state "Intercept" program, 9 FAM. L. REP. 2257 (1983); see also J. CASSETTY, THE
PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION (1983) (describing child support laws and enforcement practices); H. CLARK, supra, at 187-89 (describing state statutes). Sanctions for parents whose children fail to attend school were at issue in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972). Although the parents in that case were excused, the law itself remained in
force. For careful discussions of power relationships among parents, child, and state, see
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port a conception of parents as agents of the state, rather than
vice versa, concerning matters of child care. 56
Rather than marking a boundary limiting state intervention in
the family, then, laws governing the family define the kind of
substantive and procedural governance of the family that the
state undertakes. Consequently, problems such as those in Baby
Jane Doe's case present not questions concerning when the state
should intervene, but instead substantive questions about which
decisions regarding the child the state should approve, as well as
procedural questions about which decisionmakers the state
should permit, monitor, or supersede.
Some may claim that the term "state intervention" means, in
popular debate, excessive or overt governmental actions supplanting the decisions or freedoms of private persons. Such definitions, however, are deficient because they build into the very
term the issues needing exposure to debate: what issues of state
power are excessive, and when does a particular state allocation
of power stir controversy rather than fade into routine? Accordingly, this article will no longer use the phrase "state intervention" except with reference to the debate itself, and instead will
focus on the specific kinds of choices the state must make.
Recasting the issues in this way does not resolve them, but it
does lift the controversy from the wooden and ambiguous state
intervention debate, with its false dichotomy of intervention versus nonintervention. When one acknowledges the state's substantive and procedural choices, the difficulty of those choices
also comes into view. Substantive choices concern what kinds of
medical care decisions one should make given competing ideas
about life, death, and human relationships. Procedural choices
concern who should make those decisions, what forums for challenge should exist, and who should resolve disagreements among
the decisionmakers. These i'ssues of substantive and procedural
choices present complicated alternatives and the potential for
endless controversy. Indeed, the same tendency to oversimplify
the problem into dichotomous choices reappears in discussions
of the substantive and procedural choices. Yet once again complex and multiple variations more accurately describe the
choices for the state, rather than polarized, either/or alternatives. This Section explores these choices.
Kleinfeld, Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents, and the State, (pts. 1-2 & 3)
4 FAM. L.Q. 320, 410 (1970); 5 FAM. L.Q. 64 (1971).
56. See Kleinfeld, supra note 55.
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A. Substantive Choices
Substantive choices concern which results the state should
favor, whether by approving certain parental decisions or ordering certain results directly. For Baby Jane Doe, one crucial substantive option did not exist. Her parents could not decide to
transform the infant into a child who did not have multiple disorders. No medical treatment now known could remedy the
diminishment of her cerebral cortex and the paralysis of- her
lower body. 67 Available options included surgically sealing the
spinal column to guard against infections and repeatedly draining the fluid from her brain. Baby Doe's parents, instead, initially elected antibiotic and nutritional care. 68 After a short time,
they agreed to surgery to remove excess fluid from the infant's
brain. 69 As a medical prognosis, the infant's life expectancy
without surgery was two years, and with surgery many more
years. 60
1. Contrasting medical treatment principles- Representing
a choice in results, these different medical options match competing substantive principles for medical treatment decisions.
Electing surgery and lengthening the infant's life expectancy relates to a "right to life" medical treatment principle. 61 In an absolute version, this principle demands that Baby Jane Doe's parents should decide to undertake all measures to prolong and
57. The fact that she has these conditions has not been disputed, but there has been
dispute about the extent of disability posed by her microcephaly and hydrocephaly, see
Baer, supra note 7, at 35, 36-37. This indicates the depth of controversy in such disputes;
here the controversy included the meaning of the medical diagnosis in terms of cognitive
deficits and life opportunities.
58. Her spinal opening closed by itself over time, and a shunt operation to drain fluid
was done when Baby Jane Doe was five months old. See Chicago Sun-Times, Oct. 11,
1984, at 42, col. 1.
59. Id.
60. At trial, the parents' doctors testified that the life expectancy for the child if
surgery took place could not be estimated, but conceded when asked that it could be
twenty years. Some commentators reported twenty years as the maximum, although it
would be plausible to construe this answer as a minimum or average. Tedeschi, Infanticide and Its Apologists, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1984, at 31, 32.
61. See R. WEIR, SELECTIVE NONTREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS (1984), at 6086 (comparing positions of physicians); see also Chambers, Baby Doe: Hard Case For
Parents and Courts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1984, § 21, at 1, col. 1 (Long Island Weekly ed.)
(describing right-to-life advocates); see generally Frankena, The Ethics of Respect for
Life, in ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR Soc1AL PoucY 1, 2-6 (J. Howie ed. 1983) (articulating
contrasting philosophic positions on respect for human life). Parents choosing surgery
may experience their choice not as an expression of principle, but instead as an effort to
secure any available help for their offspring; acting in this way nonetheless expresses a
"right to life" notion in the very effort to protect and promote the infant's life.
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preserve the disabled infant's life because preserving and sustaining life represents the primary human commitment. Otherwise, no person's life stands secure from devaluation by others. 62
As Surgeon General Koop and others have maintained, opting
for the conservative course in this case-choosing not to
lengthen the infant's life expectancy-draws from the contrasting principle of "quality of life."63 Varied formulations of this
principle exist. 6 ' In general, it postulates that medical personnel
should undertake life-prolonging measures only if the infant
could know love, form relationships, or partake of other dimensions of human society that give human life a quality worth living. 65 The quality of life position may support limited treatment
to alleviate pain, withdrawal of life sustaining treatment, or even
active acts of euthanasia. In any version, however, the position
diverges from the right to life position by rejecting life as the
most important human value. Thus, the state faces a substantive
choice, whether it acts or approves the actions of others. Should
there be efforts to preserve the child's life, whatever the quality
of that life, or instead medical treatment based on the predicted
quality .of the child's life? 66
62. Koop, The Slide to Auschwitz, 3 HuM. LIFE REV. 103, 107 (1977). See also Hentoff, The Awful Privacy of Baby Doe, supra note 4, at 54, 58 (quoting Dr. Peter
Huttenlocher).
63. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 60-86. Weir also notes the distinction between diseaseoriented care-which makes prolonging life the only goal and death the measure of failure-and person-oriented care-which "places primary emphasis on the quality of life
that is to be lived." Id. at 63; see also 42 CoNG. Q. 1796 (1984) (presenting American
Medical Association's opposition to compromise on Federal Child Abuse Amendments
because of failure to consider quality of life for severely handicapped newborns).
64. See Smith, Life and Death Decisions in the Nursery: Standards and Procedures
for Withholding Lifesaving Treatment from Infants, 27 N.Y.L. Seu. L. REV. 1125, 116064 (1982) (distinguishing decisions to prefer quality over length of life from decisions to
end life because it is not worth living).
65. Cf. Frankena, supra note 61, at 34 ("Mere life, whether that of a vegetable,
animal, or human organism, has no moral sanctity as such, though it may have aesthetic
and other kinds of nonmoral value, and may be a necessary condition of consciousness,
rationality, or morality;" life acquires moral sanctity when "it is a condition of something
more" like consciousness.).
66. Another substantive principle commonly mentioned in this context is the vener- ·
able medical ethic of "do no harm." In the context of disabled newborns, this principle
can be cited to support both the right to life and quality of life positions, for some would
claim that neglecting any possible measures to prolong life is to do harm, while others
would maintain that prolonging life may itself cause harm. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 86.
One expert acknowledges that the desire to do no harm makes him uncomfortable if it
means withholding treatment from a child whose parents and doctors have decided to let
die, because the result could be a slow and lingering death. Therefore, this physician
finds himself at times "in the schizophrenic position of advocating either active euthanasia or vigorous treatment." J. FREEMAN, PRACTICAL MANAGEMENT OF MENIGOMYELOCELE 24
(1974).
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Advocates of both principles of medical treatment point to established legal doctrines for support. Typical state child abuse
and neglect statutes oblige parents to provide medical care for
their children. Statutory language casting this obligation in
terms of the "best interests of the child" supports either the
right to life or the quality of life principle. Yet the right to life
principle can draw more directly for support on general criminal
statutes against murder and specific statutes punishing infanticide or requiring medical care regardless of an infant's disabilities. 67 At the same time, the quality of life principle gains support from adults' right to refuse treatment. 68 The quality of life
position also draws upon the wrongful life and wrongful birth
doctrines. Under those doctrines, parents have argued successfully that incorrect medical advice about genetic risks or other
predictable sources of an infant's disability warrants tort damages based on the diminished quality of the child's life and the
burdens to the attending family. 69
2. Inherent problems of the medical treatment principlesConceptual and practical problems abound with both principles.
Initially, the right to life position appears to demand maximal
treatment, which could produce, at the extreme, the absurd result of requiring heroic efforts to keep everyone alive forever by
use of technological life supports. 70 Yet even this interpretation
67. See Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 393,
401-10 (1982); Robertson & Fost, Passive Euthanasia of Defective Newborn Infants: Legal Considerations, 88 J. PEDIATRICS 883, 884-85 (1976); Legal Issues in Nontreatment of
Defective Newborns, in DECISION MAKING AND THE DEFECTIVE NEWBORN 370 (C. Swinyard ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as SwINYARD]; see also Mnookin, Two Puzzles, 1984 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 667, 669 (stating that formal law denies parents' rights ever to deny treatment to
their child). But see A. HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE
114 (1977) (discussing latitude for medical discretion in treatment decisions).
68. See J. ROBERTSON, THE RIGHTS OF THE CRITICALLY ILL 28-48 (1983); see also id. at
49-70 (discussing right to stop treatment of incompetent patients); F. RozovsKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 424-30 (1984) (same).
69. In a wrongful life suit, the infant claims injury and seeks recompense; in a wrongful birth action, the parents sue for the injury to them posed by the economic and emotional costs of raising a handicapped child. See Wrongful Life, 31 UCLA L. REv. 473,
495-96 (1983). Compare Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 477 (1980) (allowing infant plaintiff with Tay-Sachs disease to recover damages)
and Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982) (allowing
infant with hereditary deafness to recover damages under wrongful life) with Park v.
Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977) (recognizing causes of action for both
parents and their child who died of kidney disease); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401,
386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (permitting cause of action for parents but not
for child, overruling Park in part); and Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979)
(permitting wrongful birth claims by parents but not claims of child having Down's
syndrome).
.
70. See Fost, Proxy Consent for Seriously Ill Newborns, in No RusH TO JUDGMENT:
EssAYS ON MEDICAL ETHICS 16 (D. Smith ed. 1978).
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grants too much. The right to life position is more deeply flawed
in its inability to guide particular medical care decisions.
Given the variety of treatments, each with risks and benefits,
that medical professionals can recommend in a given case with
the aim of preserving life, the right to life position provides no
selection criteria. Medical experts disagree about what constitutes "standard medical practice" in the care of newborns with
serious handicaps. 71 For example, parents may have a choice of
surgery or no surgery; a choice from among surgical techniques;
a choice in the timing of the surgery or the selection of the surgical team. Additionally, choices about the use of experimental or
nonconventional treatments may arise. 72 The principle of "right
to life" does not select from among these choices. A given treatment could hold both great promise and great risk; an alternative could hold less promise and less risk. Either choice arguably
could advance or defeat the simple goal of preserving life. 73
Another set of problems for the right to life position arises in
determining whether a decision not to act-an omission of possible medical care-violates the right to life principle. Societies
historically assigned different consequences to acts of direct killing and more passive conduct producing the death of a child. 7"
This problem raises the classic act-omission distinction drawn in
criminal and tort law. In those contexts, an omission becomes
culpable as an act where specified duties or obligations to act
71. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 59-61; Smith, supra note 64, at 1153-59.
72. See R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 399-446 (1978). Commentators disagree about whether anyone should
be allowed to consent to experimental treatment for a child. Compare P. RAMSEY, THE
PATIENT AS PERSON 15 (1970) (opposing proxy consent for experimental treatment because no one can consent to making someone else an adventurer) with Fried, Children as
Subjects for Medical Experimentation, in RESEARCH ON CHILDREN 107, 111-15 (J. van
Eys ed. 1978) (arguing that children including infants should have opportunity to help
do a good thing, like advance medical knowledge); McCormich, Proxy Consent in the
Experimental Situation, 18 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. 2, 13-14 (1974) (presuming child
would want promise of benefit from experiment). Comments to the Department of
Health and Human Services regulations indicate that at least actions taken in light of
the federal child abuse amendments do not require experimentation. 50 F'ed. Reg. 14,886
(Apr. 15, 1985) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340).
73. The right to life position also rests on a debatable assumption about the sanctity
of human forms, regardless of their stage of development or any other characteristic.
Medical experts pose one kind of criticism of this assumption by pointing to what they
claim are vast differences in the nature of the life presented by individuals at different
stages. One expert concludes that it is "as inappropriate to consider the neonate a small
child as it is to consider the child a small adult." R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 31 (quoting
Sheldon Kornones, director of newborn center at City of Memphis Hospital).
74. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 25 (discussing ancient Romans and Renaissance
Italians; both societies permitted passive child destruction); see also Smith, supra note
64, at 1166-68 (1982) (comparing active and passive euthanasia as artificial distinctions).
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exist, and where the omission causes harm. n The right to life
position, however, offers little guidance to establish what constitutes a culpable omission by a parent. A culpable omission depends on a failure to fulfill a well-understood duty, but the existence of such a duty is the unanswered question concerning a
disabled infant, and the basis and content for such a duty raise
additional unanswered questions. Such a duty could only come
from a community consensus specifying what constitutes a culpable omission. Yet this is precisely what is now missing, especially given the range of possible medical treatments. If right to
life advocates wish to articulate a duty for parents always to undertake any measures that could promote the life chances for
the disabled newborn, they still have a problem in articulating
the boundaries of this duty. 76
For example, the right to life principle leaves unanswered the
problem of "futile" medical treatment, even though proponents
of the principle invoke futility as its limit. 77 Would the right to
75. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing
acts and omissions).
76. See Survey Shows Split on Issue of Treating Deformed Infants, N.Y. Times,
June 3, 1983, at Al4, col. 1 (reporting Gallup poll showing the public evenly divided on
whether a severely handicapped newborn should be allowed to die); see also Committee
on Bioethics, Treatment of Critically Ill Newborns, 72 PEDIATRICS 565 (1983) (finding no
consensus on treatment); cf. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 157379 (1979) (discussing good samaritan law). Difficulties arise from the view that there is a
duty to act where life is at stake because it could also be argued that failing to authorize
medical treatment for a disabled newborn would not clearly cause harm. Refusing to
authorize surgery that would extend an infant's life may cause a shorter life for that
person. But the cause may equally be assigned to the infant's disabilities at birth. This
alternative causal argument may, however, prove too much; any infant at birth is utterly
dependent upon others for nutrition and care, and omissions by parents to meet these
needs are commonly treated as culpable omissions. What may distinguish a failure to
meet nutritional needs is precisely how obvious this omission appears in light of clear
parental duties. As public and professional opinions about children's needs and medical
necessity crystallize with a majority view, parental obligations with accompanying culpable omissions can be articulated in terms of the outer limits of individual discretion.
Although some would argue that such outer limits are reached in parental decisions
about surgery for intestinal blockage in a Down's syndrome child, continuing controversy
over that kind of decision shows that no prevailing view has yet emerged. See Summary
and Analysis, 7 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 213, 217-18 (May-June 1983) (reporting that
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
Research would direct surgery, but variety of medical and parental opinions remain); see
also Gustafson, Mongolism, Parental Desires, and the Right to Life, 16 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. 529-30 (1973). In a sense, the debate over medical care for handicapped
newborns expresses the search for new consensus in the face of shifting technological and
moral landscapes. Cf. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) (describing periods of
clarity and chaos in law). See also infra text accompanying notes 167-68.
77. The recent amendments to the federal child abuse statute redefine child abuse
and neglect for purposes of the statute to include "the withholding of medically indicated treatment" from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions: except if the
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life principle require medical treatment where medical experts
believe the effort would prove futile or where the patient would
die soon regardless of treatment? Determining the meaning of
"futility," of course, is the problem.
As raised by those who articulate the right to life position,
"futility" signifies the condition of a "dying" infant or an infant
whose medical condition would remain unameliorated after
medical treatment. 78 How would this meaning of futility apply
baby is "chronically and irreversibly comatose;" or if "the provision of such treatment
would (i) merely prolong dying, (ii)not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the
infant's life-threatening conditions, or (iii) otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of
the infant;" or "the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the
survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane." Pub. L. No. 98-457, § 121(3), 98 Stat. 1749, 1752 (1984) (amending 42 U.S.C. §
5102). Thus, Congress acknowledged the need for lines drawn between infants for whom
medical treatment is worthwhile and those for whom it is not. The line-drawing problem
itself is not resolved by the statutory language, although its terms importantly frame
decisions with a focus on futility and inhumanity.
In interpreting these concerns, the Department of Health and Human Services issued
regulations under the amendments that acknowledge the Congressional commitment to
balance "the need for an effective program and the need to prevent unreasonable governmental intervention." 50 Fed. Reg. 14,880 (1985). The Department's interpretive guidelines, not intended to be binding rules, id., eliminate the language of a proposed interpretation that referred "to situations where death is imminent and treatment will do no
more than postpone the act of dying." Id. at 14,890. The Department explained that it
still interprets the futility or "merely prolong dying" exception to the child abuse
amendment's requirements not to apply to instances "where treatment will not totally
correct a medical condition but will give a patient many years of life." Id. at 14,891. In
other words, the Department interprets the federal definition of child abuse and neglect
to encompass the withholding of medical treatment from handicapped newborns who
could gain many years of life from the medical treatment, even if that treatment would
not totally correct the medical condition. This gives more scope to the futility exception
than at least some interpretations of the proposed regulations. There remains considerable ambiguity in the final interpretation, which places renewed importance on the judgments of medical professionals about "the degree of inevitability of death, the probable
effect of any potential treatments, the projected time period within which death will
probably occur, and other pertinent factors." Id. The meaning of "reasonable medical
judgment" in this context is the same in the amendments as in the regulation, see id. at
14,882, 14,888 (defining term to mean "a medical judgment that would be made by a
reasonably prudent physician, knowledgeable about the case and the treatment possibilities with respect to the medical conditions involved."). But this term, and the meaning
of "treatment," will be subject to continuing debate. See id. at 14,890 (reviewing contrasting interpretations of treatment and reasonable medical judgment). The President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research recently acknowledged the lack of both certainty and knowledge within
the medical profession about infants born prematurely, and/or with congenital defects
and handicaps. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 198, 220 (1983).
78. See Longino, Withholding Treatment from Defective Newborns: Who Decides,
and on What Criteria?, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 377, 398-99 (1983) (arguing that the medical
feasibility approach denies treatment where death is imminent even with treatment, or
when treatment cannot restore consciousness); cf. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 146 (es-
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to a low-birth weight, premature infant who cannot breathe or
pump her own blood without assistance? Pulmonary and circulatory devices temporarily perform these functions for her, but no
prospect of future independence from the machines exists for
the infant. Using the machines may prolong her life for days or
even weeks. Add to this situation the risk that the infant's undeveloped lungs and heart cannot long sustain life functions even
with assistance, and indeed may rupture with the exertion. 79 If
the right to life principle requires treatment at this point, the
meaning of the term "life" may be at issue, not the meaning of
futility. 80 If the principle does not direct unquestioning use of all
medical devices, then a line-drawing problem must arise under
this principle as well as under the quality of life principle. 81 Indeed, the two principles merge in this respect, even though advocates of each may see only antagonism. 82
Similarly, the right to life principle has been used in efforts to
prevent discrimination on the basis of handicap; yet the results
preserve rather than resolve the issue of when treatment must
be authorized for the disabled infant. 83 As Norman Fost analyzed the situation, "[w]e withhold dialysis from an anencephalic
infant girl precisely because she is so handicapped that she cannot experience any benefit from the treatment."84 Here the
handicap itself supplies the reason for discriminatory nontreatpousing a position favoring treatment of all "nondying" infants).
79. See R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 52 (case study); id. at 140 (discussing Custody of a
Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 714, 434 N.E.2d 601, 610 (1982) and issue of prolonged or increased suffering-competing with sheer life as value); for different estimates by different people of same situation, see Tedeschi, supra note 60, contesting characterization of
Baby Jane Doe's medical situation.
80. In addition, the right to life position contains no instrinsic reason to value human
life over other forms of life. See generally Singer, Ten Years of Animal Liberation, N.Y.
REV. OF BooKs, Jan. 17, 1985, at 46 (reviewing emerging theories of equal rights for animals based on inherent value or equal interests of all living creatures).
81. Longino, supra note 78, at 399 (arguing that the medical feasibility test does not
resolve hard cases where there is no consensus about diagnosis and where people may
dispute the value of a temporary extension of life).
82. Ambiguity over this futility issue becomes a central problem in interpreting language adopted by Congress in its amendment to the child abuse statute and in efforts to
apply anti-discrimination principles to the treatment of handicapped newborns. The
child abuse amendments excuse nontreatment where treatment would be "futile," or "inhumane." See Pub. L. No. 98-457, § 121(3), 98 Stat. 1749, 1752 (1984) (amending 42
U.S.C. § 5102). It also excuses treatment that would "not be effective." See id.
83. Cf. Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 HARV. L. REV. 997,
1001-02, 1010-12 (1984) (noting ambiguity over whether "otherwise qualified" means
qualified like a nonhandicapped person or qualified given reasonable accommodation for
the handicap).
84. Fost, Putting Hospitals on Notice, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1982, at 7.
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ment. In this instance, an assessment of futility stems from the
fact of the handicap, making a rule against discrimination on the
basis of handicap less than useful as a guide for treatment
decisions.
Problems beset t.he quality of life position as well. Most importantly, it affords at best an uncertain guide about what constitutes a quality of life worth preserving. The quality of life position corresponds to arguments favoring euthanasia, sought by
people who anticipate their own degenerative prognosis and desire to end their lives as their lives become, in their own eyes, no
longer worth living. 811 In instances where the patient has already
become comatose or otherwise incapable of deciding his or her
own treatment, family members may choose euthanasia based on
what they know about the patient's desires and values. Adherence to the values of the patient continues to guide the medical
treatment even in such circumstances. 86 The self-determination
theme of this euthanasia position obviously cannot govern cases
involving a disabled newborn. Other people's assessments of that
infant's potential quality of life will always control. Other people
may orudely misjudge the effect of handicaps and grossly undervalue the life of a handicapped person. 87 Or they may romanticize life and underestimate the deprivations imposed by the
handicap as experienced by the handicapped infant. Even if
some agreement could be reached regarding what quality of life
should mean, most imaginable meanings-some measure of consciousness, ability to communicate, or to experience joy or relatedness-involve the internal world of the infant and of the ma85. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
86. See THE DILEMMAS OF EUTHANASIA (1975); EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH
(A. Downing ed. 1969); Foot, Euthanasia, 6 PHIL. & PUB. Arr. 85, 109-12 (1977); see also
Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1985) (authorizing adults to sign statement permitting withdrawing of life sustaining treatment
and freeing medical personnel from liability). See generally B. CLAR, WHOSE LIFE Is IT
ANYWAY? (1974) (exploring voluntary euthanasia in dramatic form).
87. Sondra Diamond, who has cerebral palsy, attended college, despite the prediction
by doctors that there was little or no hope she would achieve meaningful humanhood;
she had to fight for medical treatment when she suffered burns in her twenties because
doctors believed treatment was not worthwhile as she could not lead a normal life. She
herself concluded, "I do not believe that any human being does not deserve the opportunity to Jive." "/ Am Not What You See" A Film Dialogue Between Sondra Diamond
and Roy Bonisteel, reprinted in J. AREEN, P. KING, S. GOLDBERG & A. CAPRON, LAW, SciENCE AND MEDICINE 1199, 1202 (1984); Hentoff, The Awful Privacy of Baby Doe, supra
note 4, at 57-58. See generally Riga, Privacy and the Right to Die, 26 CATH. L. REV. 11315 (1981) (noting undervaluation of life and conflicts of interests in proxy decisions);
Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 213, 254 (1975) ("Life, and life alone, whatever its limitations, might be sufficient
worth" to a disabled child).
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ture person that infant will become, an internal world that
others cannot know.
Additional ambiguities arise over whether parents should prolong an infant's life if some possibility exists for achieving the
requisite quality of life in the future. Such ambiguities acquire
considerable importance in light of historical discrimination
against and underestimation of disabled people. 88 Reform efforts
and increasing medical knowledge have in the past changed the
social meaning of disabilities. Notably, Down's syndrome once
spelled institutionalization based on very low estimates of
mental and self-care capabilities, while more recent assessments
of Down's syndrome urge community care and predict varying
degrees of self-sufficiency. Today, society widely believes that a
Down's syndrome individual can experience and generate considerable love and joy. This transformation reflects both medical
advances and advocacy activity designed to change public
attitudes. 89
Future political and scientific efforts might elevate the quality
of life assessments for people now considered severely disabled.
Changes in community attitudes and activities themselves could
markedly affect the quality of life for the disabled person. The
quality of life for a wheelchair-bound person, for example, depends greatly on how· disabling the social and physical environment makes that person. As Norman Fost has written, "if buildings had ramps, if colleges would not exclude them from
dormitories ... and if airlines would not require them to be accompanied by adult companions, many such individuals would
not see themselves as significantly handicapped."90 If changes in
the physical environment can bring about such significant
changes in the social meaning of handicaps, the handicap itself
does not reside solely in the handicapped person, but instead in
the relationships between that person and the community.
These relationships can change, and also can change to some ex88. See generally Smith, Notes on the History of Childhood, HARV. MAG., July-Aug.
1984, at 64A, 64B-64C (describing the historical destruction of sick and crippled
children).
89. AN ALTERNATIVE TEXTBOOK IN SPECIAL EDUCATION (1977) (describing research and
political action to challenge socially constructed category of mental retardation); cf. M.
MACDONALD, MYSTICAL BEDLAM: MADNESS, ANXIETY AND HEALING IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1981) (examining shifting conceptions of mental illness).
90. Fost, How Decisions are Made: A Physician's View, in SwINYARD, supra note 67,
at 224. How the handicapped individuals see themselves is interdependent with how
others see them, and how others construct their shared environment. See Minow, Bilingual and Special Education: The Dilemma of Difference, 48 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
157, 204-06 (1985).
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tent the effect of that handicap in the handicapped person's
daily life. This understanding itself depends on a conception of
the meaning of the handicap as an issue for people other than
the handicapped person. If we conceive of the mobility problem
for someone in a wheelchair as not simply her problem, but as a
problem for others who may be deprived of her presence, we
could find it important to devise new options, like equipping
buildings with ramps and developing buses that can accommodate her. Her quality of life, in this sense, is mutable because it
depends in significant ways on her relationships with others, and
those relationships can change when others see her quality of
life as an issue for them. Being bound to a wheelchair may seem
less disabling than some other handicaps, like mental deficiencies. But recognizing the way social attitudes construct the
meaning of disabilities holds promise for possible changes in the
quality of daily life for mentally disabled persons as well as for
the physically disabled.
In the meantime, this mutability of the meaning of particular
handicaps offers reason to doubt assertions that disabled people
inevitably suffer from a lesser quality of life and greater unhappiness. 91 Indeed, asserted concern for the quality of life may be
used to justify confining handicapped persons to a stigmatized
status and depriving them of opportunities to become more than
others expected. 92 The quality of life position thus runs great
risks of preserving old assumptions about the meaning of various
disabilities. Parents or doctors who act on outdated assumptions
about the meanings of particular disabilities should be challenged, and yet there remains no guarantee that the child-protective agencies or courts presiding over such challenges have
any more reliable assumptions to guide their decisions. Continual process of research and advocacy could challenge old assumptions and also guard against idealized misconceptions over91. See Zachary, The Neonatal Surgeon, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 869 (1976) ("extreme disability is not synonymous with unhappiness, and we are only at the beginning of finding
ways of developing the capabilities of these patients to the maximum").
92. Taking this point a step further, nothing within the quality of life position offers
a line against unlimited, indiscriminate termination of the lives of nonperfect infants. R.
WEIR, supra note 61, at 181. For this reason, Weir recommends objective standards for
the treatment decision that use diagnostic categories, relative to the status of medical
technology available at a particular time and place. Id. at 240-41. A drawback to this
approach is its tendency to rigidify the treatment decision based on existing practices,
prevailing conceptions of given disabilities, and available technology, rather than subjecting these very conventions to criticism. Perhaps the risks of perpetuating stereotypes
and underassessments of the quality of life ahead for infants with a range of disabilities
could be reduced by making such diagnostic categories an issue for public debate. See
infra text accompanying notes 185-87.
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estimating the life chances for particular severely disabled
newborns. In what could well be painful confrontations, parents
and their doctors could be challenged with the best available information about the meaning of the particular disabilities or
deformities manifested in their child. Hospitals could help the
broader medical community and advocacy groups to disseminate
new information about the meaning and potential meanings of
varied medical prognoses. 93 With new information, predictions
about future medical advances could push a quality of life assessment toward a more positive assessment and support more
efforts to preserve a severely disabled infant's life even under a
quality of life principle. A commitment to guard against mistaken underestimations of the potential life experiences for
handicapped persons would also move the quality of life assessment toward more aggressive medical treatment. As a result, decisions under this principle may well come to resemble decisions
made according to the right to ·life view.
The quality of life assessment would increasingly find value
where it had been underestimated, even where prevalent assumptions deem the disabilities so severe that the fact of life
alone supplies the core meaning to its "quality." Similarly,
desires to avoid futile treatments could make the right to life
position converge with the quality of life view. Efforts to weigh
the benefits and costs of treatment will occupy the assessment of
futility, much as they would in an analysis of the individual's
potential quality of life. Nonetheless, neither position would dictate a result in any difficult case, so ambiguity and controversy
remain trapped within each position.
Further, the quality of life position blurs the question of
whose life is relevant to the medical care determination: the infant's or other members of the family? The quality of a family's
life may directly or indirectly enter into the calculus of the quality of the child's life. 94 Moreover, the potential quality of life for
93. It is undoubtedly with this in mind that Surgeon General Koop has called for the
creation of comprehensive information services to make available to parents of handicapped newborns (1) information about competent diagnostic services; (2) a list of governmental and private agencies able to help parent and child; and (3) names of parents
"with similar situations who have managed the problem successfully." Koop, The Handicapped Child and His Family, 48 LINACRE Q., Feb. 1981, at 23, 29, quoted in R. WEIR,
supra note 61, at 83. Given his commitment to the right to life position, however, Koop
does not include in this proposal information about parents who have chosen not to authorize aggressive medical treatment, or who have not been pleased with the results of
such treatment. A full exchange of information should include these sources as well.
94. See also Longino, supra note 78, at 389 (noting that the family's interests are
seldom discussed expressly but courts may tacitly rely on them). Compare R. WEIR,
supra note 61, at 78 (discussing Raymond Duff, who notes that "families need to be

SUMMER

1985]

Beyond State Intervention

965

the child may turn largely upon the opportunities that the parents or custodians grant to that child in terms of the quality of
care and quality of love that they offer. 911 The quality of life position obscures how much the infant's relationships to others
enter into the calculus; yet the relevance of those others to the
decision itself deserves debate. Should the child's medical treatment turn on the willingness or unwillingness of her or his parents to provide ongoing care and love? Such a result seems to
burden the child with an accident of birth beyond the disability.
The potential availability of foster or adoptive parents, willing
to care for a disabled child, could alter a quality of life assessment made with the initial assumption that the biological parents or institutions constitute the only relevant caretakers. 96 The
quality of life position thus becomes more complicated and more
contestable upon exposing its assumptions concerning the range
of possible caretakers for the child.
Both the right to life and quality of life positions rely on established legal doctrines and yet both also give rise to conceptual and practical problems. The apparent certainty of the right
to life position gives way under scrutiny to a more difficult set of
assessments about the exact duties of parents and doctors in
particular circumstances, and about the meanings of futility, dying, and life for specific infants born with severe disabilities. The
quality of life position initially seems to offer protection for autonomous choice-making, but who should be that decisionmaker
where the medical choice concerns a disabled newborn poses a
problem unanswered by the quality of life position itself. Moreover, the interdependence between any infant and the adults in
his or her life significantly affects the quality of each of their
lives. This interdependence is, if anything, even more pronounced with a handicapped person whose relationships with
other people critically affect the opportunities and experiences
that will or will not become available. The quality of life princispared the chronic sorrow of caring for infants with little or no possibility for meaningful
lives") with id. at 81 (Surgeon General Koop "thinks that physicians who engage in selective nontreatment of infants often do so primarily to prevent parents from having
burdens they do not want to bear").
95. Shaw, Conditions in Newborns that Pose Special Problems, 11 CoNTEMP. SURGERY, Oct. 1977, at 51 (arguing that assessment of the potential quality of life of an
infant with Down's syndrome depends on home life with parents as well as the child's
mental and physical abilities).
96. In contrast, if the child's likely destination is a state institution, the quality of life
would be predictably low-and yet this has less to do with the child than with the resources society is unwilling to devote to him or her. See infra text accompanying note
170 (discussing institutions like Willowbrook).
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ple is not only highly ambiguous, it also obscures the centrality
of other questions about who will become involved with the disabled infant, and how.
Both the right to life and quality of life principles also share
the tendency of legal and philosophical reasoning to approach
difficult problems with abstract standards, and to couch actual
conflicts in terms of conflicting rights. The right to life position
on its face fits this description. It translates these highly complicated, emotionally charged medical care determinations as a
conflict between the right to life and other rights, like parental
rights. And it resolves this conflict with reference to an explicit
hierarchy of rights: the right to life supersedes all others. The
quality of life position is quite similar in its reliance on abstractions translating the complicated real situation into an ideal,
claimed to trump others. A serious drawback to approaching
problems in the world with abstract principles is their tendency
to obscure the very ambiguity of those problems, and the complex human relationships implicated in both the problems and
their solutions. The abstract principles carry an illusion of uncontroverted answers and empower their advocates to treat opponents as wrong, even though aspects of different positions
may be simultaneously powerful and compelling.
Perhaps a more serious difficulty arises when competing, abstract standards become platforms for lofty and impassioned argument, removed from the particular case and invigorated by
emotional commitments symbolized by the abstract standards
themselves. Poised on their separate platforms, contending
debators are unlikely to persuade each other or glimpse how
much they have in common. This description may fit the emerging debate between advocates of the right to life and of quality
of life in controversies like Baby Jane Doe's. This pattern already fits the debate in the related area of abortion; examining
that area could shed light on the handicapped newborn issues
for the future.
3. The right to life principle and the quality of life principle in the abortion controversy- The right to life and quality
of life positions share historic roles in the related, yet distinct
controversy over abortion. The dichotomous quality of the two
positions appears even more stark there. 97 The abortion debate
97. One aim of this analysis is to show how seemingly dichotomous conceptions, such
as the right to life versus the quality of life and state intervention versus nonintervention, obscure how each side of the dichotomy merges into the other, through shared assumptions or shared problems. Once a focus for political debate, the dichotomous conception remains rigid as a vehicle for expression of opposing groups and avenues for
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also exposes the problems with each principle while suggesting
how the appeal of the two principles varies according to the type
of dispute in which the principles clash. As in the handicapped
infant context, the "right to life" argument raised in the abortion context stakes out an absolute position on life and leaves to
opponents the more uncertain and controverted claims about
quality of life. The quality of life argument, couched as the
"right to choose" claim about abortion, stakes out an absolute
position on private freedom that leaves the more uncertain
claims about state intervention for its opponents. 98 The quality
of life position in both contexts expresses belief in the capacity
and right of people to plan their lives. 99
rapprochement diminish, as the abortion debate exemplifies. Each side stereotypes the
other, and also forces disagreements into crude oppositions. Geertz, Distinguished Lecture: Anti Anti-Relativism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 263, 263-64 (1984) (criticizing view
that anti-anti-abortion means pro-abortion rather than pro-choice).
98. The Supreme Court's decisions on the subject of abortion have struck uneasy
compromises, first by according different decisional power to the pregnant woman and
her doctor in relation to the stage of pregnancy and notions of fetal viability, see Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and next by according the power to choose an abortion only
to women who can afford it without state assistance, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). These compromises grow increasingly unstable as new technologies alter the timing and meaning of fetal viability; see King, The
Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 M1cH.
L. REV. 1647 (1979); R. ARDITT, R. KLEIN & S. MINDEN, TEsT-TuBE WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE
FOR MOTHERHOOD? (1984) (estimating effects of new reproductive technologies), and as
the economic discrimination in Maher undergoes criticism; see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 933-34 n.77 (1978). The abortion controversy in the future may well
emerge in a new form, connecting the issues of new reproductive technologies, like artificial wombs, women's freedom from unwanted pregnancies, and the demand for babies by
parents unable to bear their own. These new options may allow the legal issues to shake
loose from unstable compromises between dichotomous right to life/right to choose debates. The legal debate could focus instead on (1) the rights a woman would have to
avoid carrying a fetus for nine months by giving it over to a substitute mother-real or
artificial; (2) the rights the future child would have to a loving home if someone decides
to complete its fetal development outside its mother's womb; and (3) the rights of adults
who want to be parents to have children produced through new reproductive technologies. See HEW Support of Human In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 44 Fed.
Reg. 35,055 (1979) (responding to fears about effects of in vitro technology on family
rights and privacy); King, supra (discussing embryo transfer).
99. The "right to life" and "right to choose" positions rest on different conceptions of
the problem, and perhaps different world views altogether. See K. LUKER, supra note 40,
at 158-91 (describing world-views of activists on both sides of abortion debate). But see
Addelson, Baby-Killers and Fetus Fetishists: Review of Abortion and the Politics of
Motherhood, 2 WOMEN'S REv. BOOKS, Nov. 1984, at 14, 15 (arguing that Luker fails to
uncover the complexity of coalitions within each side of abortion debate, and offering the
fact that "each side includes some supporters who are closer to the other side's supporters on nearly every issue but that of abortion").
The Baby Jane Doe case draws the crossfire in the battle already raging on abortion.
Many "right to life" activists spoke out for state intervention to help Baby Doe, and the
lawyer who initiated the lawsuit against the infant's parents had previously initiated legal action on behalf of fetuses to halt abortions. See supra note 9. In addition, the Doe
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Despite apparent symmetry in the arguments available in the
two contexts, the quality of life and right to life positions take
on different casts with the different applications. The quality of
life principle emphasizes free choice in the abortion context for
the woman who seeks control over her life while the quality of
life concern focuses on the life of the handicapped newborn in
the medical treatment context. Although both versions express
the belief that people can and should plan and control what
happens in their lives, the argument for the pregnant woman's
right to choose an abortion draws importantly on claims that
women have not in the past had power over important decisions
in their lives, and especially deserve power over decisions affecting their own bodies. The analogous claim in the medical treatment context urges autonomy for parents, who historically have
had power over important decisions, and may even be suspected
of abusing that power. 100 At the same time, analogies to euthanasia for dying adults may support a parental decision to refuse
medical treatment for a severely disabled newborn in a way that
pro-choice defenses of abortion cannot maintain.
The right to life argument in the abortion context pits the
rights of a fetus against the rights of a woman to control her own
body while the right to life argument in the medical treatment
context raises the rights of an infant against the rights of parents whose burdens, however serious, 101 are not the same as the
bodily burden for the woman facing pregnancy. 102 Thus, the very
question of whose individual rights and whose quality of life are
in jeopardy is put to a contest in the debates over medical treatment for disabled newborns and abortion. Who should be allowed to exercise power over important choices arises as a cencase challenged the battle lines as drawn in the abortion context, as some participants in
the debate expressly called upon liberals in the abortion context to side with the "right
to life" position for the child who is already alive. See Hentoff, The Awful Privacy of
Baby Doe, supra note 4, at 54-56.
100. It is also possible that the notion of parental power is founded on illusory historical notions of a golden age of family autonomy and stability, but judicial power has
often been used to reinforce parental authority, for whatever reason. Burt, supra note 45,
at 331, 333-36.
101. See generally H. FEATHERSTONE, A DIFFERENCE IN THE FAMILY (1982) (documenting a family's ordeal with dying disabled child); Baldwin & Glendinning, Employment, Women and Their Disabled Children, in A LABOUR OF LOVE: WOMEN, WORK AND
CARING 53-71 (1983) (reporting that the economic and emotional costs of caring for severely disabled child tend to fall on mother).
102. But see .C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 70-104 (1982) (noting that women
characterize the abortion decision as a conflict between responsibilities rather than a
conflict of rights; a conflict between responsibilities to care for the child and to care for
the self). See generally infra text accompanying notes 169-75 (discussing responsibilities
of caring for handicapped child).
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tral question under both the right to life and quality of life
principles, and the contrast between the situation of the pregnant woman and the situation of the parents of the handicapped
newborn strikes different people differently. The rhetorical force
of the right to life position may appeal to new constituencies in
the medical treatment context, such as handicapped rights
groups. The powerlessness of the infant may move people who
are less moved by the powerlessness of the fetus, in part due to
the significance people attribute to the moment of birth in moral
status, and in part due to the contrast between the positions of
the pregnant woman and the parents of a child who is already
born. 103 The abstract principles alone do not determine the lineup in political debates even though they may define the battle
lines.
In the context of handicapped newborns, the two substantive
positions appear less polarized and rigidly positioned than they
do in the abortion debate. Perhaps this reflects the relative
length of time occupied by the two policy problems in the crucible of public debate. Rather than following the path of the abortion debate, I suggest that we resist the tendency to polarize the
infant care debate into dichotomous substantive positions much
as I urge rejection of the polarized version of the state intervention debate. This polarization may be tempting precisely at the
moment of a tough decision, when the decisionmaker may feel
both moved and repelled by the plight of the infant. Instead we
should acknowledge the problems inherent in each side. Yet the
substantive debate represents only half of another dichotomous
treatment of the problem: the separation between substantive
and procedural choices. As the convention goes, when substance
confounds, procedure beckons. No panacea, however, lies there
either.

B.

Procedural Choices

Distinguishing between substance and procedure is a classic
103. See Feldman & Murray, supra note 38 (discussing starvation of Indiana Baby
Doe); Mnookin, supra note 67, at 675 (discussing political groups' responses to Baby Doe
controversy); cf. R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS 19-20, 46-48 (1979) (describing the
power of the powerless in compelling the attitudes and actions of others). The experience
of being moved by the infant's powerlessness may, however, engender ambivalence by
exposing the adult's power to influence both the quality and the fact of the infant's life.
The substantive debate contrasting right to life with quality of life positions fails to
expose to view just this problem, which will be explored in section III infra.
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legal concern. This dichotomy makes procedure important precisely when the more obviously important substance hits a
logjam. When we cannot agree about what to do, it becomes urgent to know-and to control-who will have the final say. Not
only will this procedural choice control the outcome of the substantive debate, it may also yield the independently desirable
feature of some conclusive decision, or some apparent resolution,
whatever its content. Thus, deciding who will decide shifts the
debate from ambiguous substantive questions onto a procedural
question that one can specificly answer.
For example, the state may grant the infant's parents an absolute or a qualified power to decide the medical treatment issue,
give doctors and hospitals power to make or review the decision,
accord public officials, judges, or court-appointed guardians th~
power to decide, or transfer the authority to treatment committees composed of lay and medical personnel. No neutral resting
place exists on the issue of who should decide. One way or another, the state approves or selects the decisionmaker, whether
it cedes choice to parents or establishes countervailing decisionmakers and processes for decision. And the state decides
whether that decisionmaker's choice will constitute a final decision or will remain subject to review. If the decision remains
subject to review, the state determines who will conduct the
review.
This inevitability of public choice imbues a case like Baby
Jane Doe's with the dimensions of classic drama that have long
captured public attention: inevitable suffering combined with
the possibility that human will may avert disaster. 10• Like Greek
tragedy, the Baby Jane Doe case presents human suffering to an
104. See W. KAUFMANN. TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 360-71, 373-76 (1968) (noting that
elements of tragedy include great suffering, moral conflict, human intention to reduce
suffering but guilt in continuing to inflict it); cf. Cavell, The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear, in Do WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY 267, 309-10, 317-18 (1976) (discussing
the tragic theme of judging a world where good is doomed and injustice may flourish;
and human responsibility includes responsibility for fate). Cavell powerfully evokes the
experience of a member of the audience who wants to alter what happens on stage but
must learn he can do nothing to alter the choices the actors themselves must make:
"There is nothing and we know there is nothing we can do. Tragedy is meant to make
sense of that condition." Id. at 330. In a sense, public preoccupation with cases of medical care decisions for handicapped newborns enacts such a drama, where the observer
can do nothing and must learn to deal with this without at the same time converting the
agonizing choices of the actors into mere entertainment for the audience. See id. at 348;
see also infra text accompanying notes 136-44 (discussing legal standing for strangers).
Yet, in another sense, the tragedy arises because the very meaning of the handicap could
be changed, in some measure, if the observer overcame paralysis and revulsion and
treated the handicapped person differently.
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audience and suggests that at least one aspect of existence is agony that humans must live through rather than avoid. 106 Rather
than turning heated debates into technical ones, the transition
from substance to procedure preserves the difficulties in cases
like Baby Jane Doe's. This Section explores the state's dilemmas
in determining who decides, whether the initial decision is reviewable, and who conducts that review.
1. Who decides?a. The distinction between substance and procedure- The
move from substance to procedure recapitulates rather than bypasses the inevitability of choice. Moreover, in choosing who
should choose, the state must address the difficulties behind
both the state intervention debate and the debate between right
to life and quality of life advocates. The substantive choice between the child's right to life and the parent's right to choose
incorporates a choice between decisionmakers. The state either
lets the parents choose, or supervises the parents' choice and
supplants it if necessary to attain the desired result, whether
drawn from the right to life position or the quality of life
position. 106
b. Self-determination or proxy decision making- The
state's choice from among these alternatives draws back into dis105. See W. KAUFMANN, supra note 104, at 373. Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt
explore the tragic dimension of social allocation of scarce resources, like artificial kidneys, in G. CALABRESI & P. BoBBl'M', TRAGIC CHOICES 21 (1978). In their analysis, the
sense of powerlessness to remedy massive problems may be translated into societal support for extraordinary efforts to respond to limited crises. "[T]he United States will
spend a million dollars to rescue a single, downed balloonist but will not appropriate a
similar sum to provide shore patrols." Id. In the area of medical treatment for handicapped newborns, a similar dynamic could be at work. People feel powerless to solve the
general problem of handicaps, and indeed, the problem of assuring every child opportunities for a full and happy life. This sense of powerlessness may translate into pressure
for extraordinary measures in a few, widely publicized cases where individual, disabled
newborns face medical treatment decisions.
George Eliot's conception of tragedy as the human struggle in spite of grand submission identifies the heroic dimension in choosing resignation before the inevitable; she
also Jinks this attitude with a sense of connection with other people. Thus, she reasoned
that the individual faces common misfortune best through acceptance, and "imagination
actively interested in the lot of mankind generally." 3 GEORGE ELIOT'S LIFE AS RELATED
IN HER LE'M'ERS AND JOURNALS 33-34 (1885), quoted in S. GRAVER, GEORGE ELIOT AND
COMMUNITY: A STUDY IN Soc1AL THEORY AND FICTIONAL FORM 195 (1984). Here, then, is a
conception of tragedy as deepening the sense of human connection rather than human
isolation.
106. The current argument includes no one urging state supervention of parental decisions to authorize medical treatment; only decisions declining treatment trigger the
demand for state review, even though the opposite is theoretically as plausible. This lack
of symmetry in the actual debate strikingly reveals assumptions that parents rather than
the state will be inclined to err on the side of nontreatment; it also reveals the political
stance of the pro-interventionists as generally aligned with the right to life position.
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pute the conceptions of family and state. If controversy arises
over which decisionmakers can best approximate self-determination for the infant, the competing pictures of the oppressive
family and the oppressive state underlie contrasting preferences
for parents or other decisionmakers, just as these competing pictures underlie discussions of state intervention. For instance, a
parental decision to forego surgery for the child appears unproblematic if one views the family as a source of love and selflessness. In contrast, if one distrusts the parents, a stranger's decision approved by the state appears more promising as an
approximation of the child's self-determination.
But these contrasting conceptions of the family and the state
should not obscure the problematic nature of the very notion of
a "proxy" decisionmaker. The term "proxy" implies someone
who knows the affected person's interests and indeed received
decisional power directly from that person, as with proxy voting
for corporate shareholders. Yet even in the corporate context,
reasons exist to doubt that a shareholder knowingly assigns his
voting interest and that the proxy assignment advances the
shareholder's interest. In the medical care context, proxy decision making produces several more complications. The term refers to decisions that someone other than the affected party
makes under one of two approaches: best interests analysis and
substituted judgment. Under substituted judgment, the decisionmaker inquires into what the affected person would choose if
he or she could choose. Evidence about the person's prior wants
and express or implied direction inform the decisionmaker's
judgment. 107 This effort is fraught with guesswork. The substituted judgment approach claims to operate objectively through
efforts to find evidence of the wants and concerns of the patient,
but it also searches for the subjectivity of the patient by inquiring into what the patient personally would want, which in turn
107.
In trying to make a decision for a patient who can't decide for himself about lifesustaining treatment, we're after moral informed consent . . . It requires the
surrogate decision-maker to try to determine what decisions the patient would
make if he were able to at the time. This requires intense effort by the surrogate,
and the health care team to find out what the patient may have communicated
on the subject.
Boisen, Mds, Lawyers Probe Ethical, Legal Issues in Ending Treatment, Am. Med.
News, Apr. 6, 1984, at 17, 17 (quoting Frank Marsh); see also City Bank Farmers Trust
Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594, 599 (1945) (substituted judgment should be made acting
"upon the same motives and considerations as would have moved" the incompetent). See
generally Baron, Medicine and Human Rights: Emerging Substantive Standards and
Procedural Protections for Medical Decision-Making within the American Family, in
THE RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT 575 (1985).
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depends upon who the patient is. It relies on the imaginative
effort of the decisionmaker to construct what the patient would
want, given what the surrogate knows. At its best, the substituted judgment approach may express concerns and sympathy
for the patient, rather than actually divining that person's unknown wishes. 108 Yet whatever the success of efforts by family
and friends to imagine the past wants of a now comatose eightyyear old, substituted judgment makes little sense for a newborn
who has no history nor prior expressions of wants. 109
Under the alternative form of proxy decision making-best interests analysis-the decisionmaker determines from an external
stance the needs, risks, and benefits to the affected person. 110
This approach also appeals to objectivity, rationality, and consensual assessments of the benefits and detriments of the proposed medical treatment. m Best interests analysis addresses the
interests, not the desires, of the patient. 112 This decision making
about the child's interests must treat the situation hypothetically and removed from the particular circumstances and identity of the infant, 113 although best interests analysis is intended
to make that infant's interests paramount over all other interests.114 Subjective elements may emerge, however, as the particular views of the proxy decisionmaker enter into the best interests calculus. 115
More importantly, assessment of the child's best interests is
also problematic because no one can be certain of another's interests. The Western liberal commitment to individual auton108. Cf. S. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN: ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE 140 (1982) (discussing Wittgenstein's notion that one individual can conclude that another has pain by
reference to his or her own experience with pain).
109. See In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 440-41, 321 S.E.2d 716, 719 (1984) ("Under the
doctrine of substituted judgment the decisionmaker bases the decision on what he believes the patient, if competent, would have done. While this analysis is useful in the
case of adults, it is difficult to apply in the case of young children."); Riga, supra note 83,
at 113-14 (discussing substituted judgment); Roberston, supra note 87 (same). It could
be argued that substituted judgment at least invites an inquiry into an imagined experience for the child rather than an inquiry into the adult decisionmaker's view of the
child's interests. Yet it will unavoidably be the adult decisionmaker who tries to imagine
the child's experience. See Longino, supra note 78, at 396 (noting that substituted judgment in practice becomes a question about what a reasonable person so situated would
do).
110. Macklin, Return to the Best Interests of the Child, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE
CHILD 265, 300 (1982).
111. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 198-99.
112. Feinberg, The Child's Right to an Open Future, in ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR SOCIAL Poucv 97, 99 (J. Howie ed. 1983).
113. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 177.
114. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A SoLNIT, supra note 43, at 5.
115. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 199.
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omy and self-determination relies on a view that only the self
can have the selrs interests at heart. 116 No way exists to achieve
self-determination when one person makes decisions for another;
this axiom holds true whether parents or others direct medical
treatment or withhold it. Therefore, even a proxy decision
grounded in an assessment of the child's best interests disguises
any decisionmaker's inability to know what a self-determining
infant would choose. 117 The best interests analysis remains as
problematic as it was before being draped within the folds of a
proxy decision.
c. Closeness or distance- No decisionmaker for the infant
can act in accord with an infant's self-determination; yet notions
of proximity and distance from the infant's self affect the appeal
of alternative decisionmakers. Parents appear to have the advantage of closeness, commitment to the child, and perhaps love
and attachment through the parent-child relationship. From
these sources, the parents may bring persistence and hope to the
medical treatment decision, and work to preserve the child's
life-or end it, if the child's suffering seems too great. From this
116. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, supra note 52, at 136, 142. Individual autonomy, even under
this tradition, must be fitted into the social and natural worlds that set some boundaries
on individual power, and the very concept of autonomy incorporates these implicit limits. See generally Benjamin, The Oedipal Riddle: Authority, Autonomy, and the New
Narcissism, in AUTHORITY IN AMERICA 195, 199-205 (1981) (arguing that autonomy is developed in relation to authority and internalized norms). Thus, autonomy "can refer either to the capacity to govern oneself, which of course is a matter of degree, or (on the
analogy to a political state) to the sovereign authority to govern oneself, which is absolute within one's own moral boundaries (one's 'territory,' 'realm,' 'sphere,' or 'business.')," Feinberg, supra note 112, at 97, 114; cf. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 180-88 (1977) (arguing that the rise of the will theory of contract is linked
to formalist notions of objectivity and bounded rather than subjective and equitable
notions).
Philosophers also debate the certainty with which anyone may know his or her own
interests, Feinberg, supra note 108, at 116-19 (arguing that a person's good may not
coincide with person's choices or desires; but person's preferences molded by others);
others cast doubt on whether anyone may know even his or her own experiences and
perceptions. See S. KRIPKE, supra note 108, at 60-83; H. PUTMAN, REASON, TRUTH, AND
HISTORY 71-72 (1982). These two forms of skepticism produce some irony; while some
philosophers maintain that no one can understand what goes on in another's mind,
others maintain that no one can understand what goes on in his or her own mind without
reference to communal enterprises like language. These positions are not, however, inconsistent, in the sense that one can believe that one cannot know what another person
knows while also believing that human knowledge is located and framed by the society
and culture in which it forms-all larger than any given individual. Cf. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER EssAYS 68, 89-90 (1969) (arguing that building blocks of perception may be culturally variable).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 83 & 104 (regarding substituted judgment,
proxy decision, and best interests analyses); Minow, Why Ask Who Speaks for the
Child, 53 HARV. EDuc. REV. 444, 446 & n.4 (1983) (describing conflict between self-determination goal and proxy decision-making).

SUMMER

1985]

Beyond State Intervention

975

vantage point, any decisionmaker other than the parents sits too
far removed from both the emotional fabric and actual responsibility in the situation for the state to entrust that decisionmaker
with the medical treatment decision. 118
Yet many observers cite parents' closeness as a disadvantage,
a "conflict of interest," because their life-style and commitments
depend on the child's future. 119 Parents may worry about the
economic and emotional costs of raising a handicapped child.
Consequently, their closeness to the child may disadvantage
them in determining the child's own interests. Alternatively,
parents' closeness to the child could disadvantage them because
they may care and love the child too much. Their selfless love
for the child, rather than their worries about the burden of the
child, may lead them to choose medical treatment to prolong the
child's life despite the pain or futility of such measures. 120 On
the other hand, parents may love the child too much to allow
extended medical treatment that continues the infant's pain. In
either view, problems of bias, subjectivity, or over-involvement
persist. By contrast, decisionmakers other than the parents, such
as doctors, guardians appointed by a court, or treatment committees, have the advantage of distance and objectivity. Thus,
underlying assumptions about the consequences of parental
closeness will guide the state's decision to grant or deny deci118. Arguments such as these have supported decisions recognizing the right of parents or guardians to refuse treatment on behalf of another. See Superintendent v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,355 A.2d
647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Alternatively, it could be argued that the state's
position bears a resemblance to the parents'. The very state which assigns parents the
duty to care for children may then conclude that because of this duty, parents have a
conflict of interest when facing a medical care decision. Still another approach would
claim that if the state is behind the reinforcement of parental duties-and also holds
responsibility for the child if the parents default on their duty-then the state itself is
not without interests that could conflict with the child's. In terms of ultimate ignorance
about the child's interests, and also ultimate responsibility for the child, the parents and
the state are rather similarly situated. See infra text accompanying notes 170-75 (proposing an increase in the state's duties to equate their conflicting interests with the
parents').
119. See Capron, The Authority of Others to Decide About Biomedical Interventions With Incompetents, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD, supra note 110, at 115, 133;
see also supra text accompanying notes 94-96 (noting that the quality of life analysis
obscures question of whose quality of life is at issue).
Medical personnel fall subject to the same charges of bias through proximity, especially to the extent that the medical personnel defer to the parents as clients whose
wishes should govern.
120. Knowing what kind of pain the infant may experience could prove as difficult as
knowing what lies at the end of that pain-salvation or nothingness: The parents' views
about the possibilities of an afterlife for the child could influence their decision, which
could support claims on a freedom of religion theory for their privilege to decide what
should happen to their child.
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sional authority to parents.
Like the competing conceptions of the nature of the family
and the state, these contrasting assessments of closeness and
distance underlie arguments about the choice of decisionmakers
for the infant's medical treatment. Each view of parental closeness and subjectivity parallels a view of the virtues or defects of
the distance and objectivity manifested by alternative decisionmakers such as state officials, doctors, or treatment committees. Distance disqualifies a decisionmaker if the closeness of the
parents signifies greater responsibility and care. The distance of
another decisionmaker appears desirable for those who deem parental closeness disqualifying because parents may care more for
their own needs than for the child's. Regardless of one's views
concerning the relative advantages and disadvantages of closeness to and distance from the child, serious doubts persist about
whether someone other than the parents can know the child's
interests.
To the extent that parents suffer from the limitation that one
can neither know the interests of anyone but oneself nor achieve
self-determination for anyone but oneself, so do state officials,
doctors, and treatment committees. To the extent that parents'
roles in the child's life and attitudes toward the child disqualify
them as decisionmakers, the other possible decisionmakers suffer from similarly prejudicial roles and attitudes. The very noninvolvement and freedom from continuing responsibility that individual state officials, doctors, or treatment committees enjoy
influence their assessments of the child's future. Ultimately, the
state, in selecting a decisionmaker, must determine what proximity to the child and amount of continuing responsibility
should qualify or disqualify a decisionmaker. The state will in
effect select as decisionmaker parents, who will take into account the difficulties of raising a handicapped child, or decisionmakers other than the parents, who either will fail to consider these difficulties because these are not their problems, or
will themselves need to determine whether such issues are concerns relevant to the treatment decision. The evaluation of competing decisionmakers turns, then, on assumptions about the effects of varied relationships to the child, and how these
relationships influence perceptions of the child's interests. These
assumptions, in turn, reflect the knotty substantive issues about
the medical treatment decision that make procedural solutions
appear more feasible. Procedure provides no escape.
In sum, the three sets of dualistic concepts for analyzing "who
decides" initially offer structure to the procedural analysis, but
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that structure fades under scrutiny. The distinction between
process and substance blurs as each procedural option exposes
the ongoing substantive dilemmas. The contrast between selfdetermination and determination by others recurs in formulations of "proxy" decision-making notions even where the patient
is incapable of self-determination. And worries about different
decisionmaker's closeness to and distance from the child combine with desires for subjectivity and objectivity even while
echoing opposing notions of trust in family and state. Little resolution emerges by picking one side of any of these dichotomies.
Focusing on a procedural choice revives substantive disputes.
Conceding that the patient cannot make the treatment decision
leaves the search for the infant's interests untethered; appeals to
the infant's expected desires or his or her family's desires are
not compelling. Yet seizing on the closeness of the parents as a
basis for allowing them to decide for the child can provoke challenges that the parents fear or love too much.
It is possible that each successive characterization may alter
the seeming appeal of the opposing sides. An argument cast in
terms of process may divert attention from substance, and tap
into independent hopes for a legal regime that assures the freedoms of private persons. An argument cast in terms of proxy
decision making, in contrast, may soothe objections to intrusions
on such freedoms. The proxy notion implies such close connections between the decisionmaker and the person affected by the
decision that this exception to the self-determination principle
appears relatively unproblematic-even though there is no possible chance of self-determination by the handicapped newborn.
And the third formulation, contrasting the closeness and distance of a range of possible substitute decisionmakers, could alter yet again the appeal of competing arguments. Here, suspicions of parents could well become heightened, because parents'
proximity to the situation may smack of bias, conflicting interests, and subjectivity, in contrast to the seeming objectivity of
the more distant alternative decisionmakers. The alternative formulations of the problem, then, may draw on images and ideas
that influence the appeal of one outcome rather than another,
even though the same problem could be tackled through each of
the other formulations. The sheer choice of characterizations of
the problem could then influence the likely result.
Yet the failures of these alternative, dichotomous formulations
stem not simply from their conceptual indeterminacy nor from
their almost arbitrary influence on the appeal of contrasting outcomes. The more serious defect is that these formulations ob-
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scure the ways in which any decision about the child will grow
from and express relationships marked by ambivalence. It is not
just the parents, but also the doctors and state officials, who
have relationships with the infant and who may experience conflicting desires to help and to flee, to identify with the infant
and to avoid identification. What happens, then, when decisionmakers turn to .resolve particular cases with these less than
helpful, dualistic categories of analysis? A case examined in the
next Section suggests that the dualities, contrasting objectivity
and subjectivity, and procedural and substantive issues, do not
yield closure, and that an unusual judge may break their mold
and acknowledge his own relationship to the child.
2. Applying dichotomous concepts to procedural choices:
the case of Phillip Becker- Each of the tensions described in
the last Section appears in another case in which adults contested both the medical care alternatives for a child and the selection of a decisionmaker. Like Baby Jane Doe, Phillip Becker's
case also captured public attention. 121 Shortly after his birth, his
parents discovered that Phillip had Down's Syndrome and institutionalized him. Phillip was also born with a heart defect. 122
His institutional caretakers and doctors repeatedly sought, without success, consent from his parents for medical procedures to
assess and repair the heart defect. 123 Another family, the
Heaths, then sought guardianship and court authorization to
consent to the medical treatment. The Heath's guardianship petition requested authority to make the medical care decision,
but also requested rights to custody and care for Phillip. 124 Unlike the stranger who initiated court action in the case of Baby
121. E.g., L.A. Times, Oct. 21, 1981, at l; Parental Rights . . .'best interests,' 67
A.BA J. 1552 (1981).
122. He was born with a ventricular septal defect, a hole between his right and left
ventricals, that produces greater strain on the heart, and ultimately leads to death. In re
Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946
(1980). This decision affirmed a trial court's refusal to find the child a dependent of the
court due to deprivation of the necessities of life. Evidence at trial suggested that surgery
to correct the heart defect could be more risky for a person like Phillip who has Down's
syndrome and with pulmonary vascular changes. Id.; see also Annas, Denying the Rights
of the Retarded: The Phillip Becker Case, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1979, at 18, 19
(criticizing court for approving nontreatment of handicapped child due to slightly
greater health risks and presumptively lesser quality of life).
123. A critical problem was the effect of delay which made medical procedures more
risky as time passed. Guardianship of Phillip Becker, Order re Final Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, 75, 78, 82, No. 101981 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara).
124. Guardianship of Phillip Becker, No. 101981, at 2 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1981). An edited version of this decision is reprinted in J. AREEN, FAMILY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS
296 (Supp. 1983). See also Herbert & Patsy H. v. Warren B., 137 Cal. App. 3d 407, 188
Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983) (affirming trial court decision on totality of circumstances).
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Jane Doe, 1211 the Heaths had befriended Phillip, worked with
him at the institution through a volunteer program, and over the
course of several years, brought him into their own family's life
through overnight visits, holidays, and close relationships. After
an extended trial, the trial court concluded that the Heaths had
become Phillip's psychological parents. The court awarded
guardianship to the Heaths and permitted them to authorize
medical treatment. The court also authorized a medical procedure to determine the feasibility of surgery on the heart
defect. 126
Although the court started with the procedural choice, substantive choices preoccupied its opinion. The court began with
the question, "Who speaks for the child?," but soon turned to
evaluate the quality of parental care offered Phillip by the
Heaths and by his biological parents, and the conceptions each
set of parents had of Phillip and his quality of life. According to
the court, Phillip's parents maintained a conception of an unskilled and devalued person, incapable of love, based on the initial advice of doctors that Phillip belonged in an institution.
Phillip's parents clung to the assessment offered by doctors at
the time of his birth while the Heaths acted on a changing conception of Down's syndrome. The Heaths pictured Phillip as an
educable and valuable person capable of love. In a sense, this
case vividly presents how different understandings of a disability
can have major consequences for the actual quality of life available to the disabled person. And the court treated these comparative assessments of Phillip's quality of life as central evidence
concerning both the procedural question of who should make the
medical treatment decision, and the substantive issue of whether
treatment of the heart condition should go forward. 127 The
choice of decisionmakers thus marked a choice in conceptions of
the child's quality of life and in the substantive choices the decisionmakers would reach about the medical treatment the child
deserved. The court found the Heaths' conception-and their
125. See supra text accompanying note 9.
126. Guardianship of Phillip Becker, No. 101981 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1981). The trial
court did not, however, terminate the parental rights of the Beckers. The appellate court
affirmed; it emphasized that the fact of detriment to Phillip was established not by his
parents' decision to institutionalize him, but by their decision to remain emotionally and
physically detached. Herbert & Patsy H. v. Warren B:, 139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 781 (1983). After this decision, the parties reached a settlement, and successful
heart surgery was performed on Phillip. J. AREEN, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d
ed. 1985). The Heaths established a financial trust to assist Phillip. They believe he will
be able to work in a semi-sheltered environment with other handicapped people. Id.
127. Guardianship of Phillip Becker, No. 101981, 8-10, 12-14 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1981).
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claim for guardianship-more persuasive, and likely to offer the
least detrimental alternative for Phillip: a life worth living.
Still, the procedural question of who should decide what
should happen to Phillip remained for the court. Here the court
sought some way to catch a glimpse of the choice Phillip himself
would make; self-determination of some sort seemed more preferable than arrogation of the decision by the court. The self-determination cast to a quality of life principle thus guided the
judge to search for some way to couch a decision about Phillip as
a decision he wanted. Acknowledging that the state provided no
method for a mentally retarded child to state a preference, the
court adapted the substituted judgment notion from other jurisdictions. 128 The court then applied an unprecedented approach
to this substituted judgment method: a "[P]latonic dialogue
with the court posing the choices to Phillip and Phillip's preference being ascertained from the more logical choice." 129 Through
its Platonic dialogue the court turned the procedural problem of
who should decide what should happen to Phillip back to the
substantive choices of the care alternatives and quality of life
estimates offered by the competing sets of parents. The court
used the self-determination mode invited by the imagined dialogue with Phillip to frame the court's determination of the
child's interest. 130 And the competing conceptions of Phillip's
abilities, held by the Heaths and the Beckers, figured prominently in the court's evaluation of what Phillip would want.
The court did not discuss expressly whether closeness qualified or disqualified either set of parents for decision making, although it acknowledged the biological tie between Phillip and
his parents, and refrained from terminating that relationship. 131
128. The court announced that substituted judgment entailed discerning "as nearly
as possible the incompetent person's 'actual interests and preferences,' " and that other
courts had found this method consistent with the best interests doctrine. Id. at 15-16.
129. Id. at 16-17.
130. "Phillip's case may pave the way for recognition of a developmentally disabled
child's right to choose his fate or destiny by the substituted judgment approach, or by
the type of legal proceedings we are presently engaged in." Id. at 17. Yet self-determination for the child is to be secured by decision making by the court.
131. The court thus permitted the Heaths to act as guardians without terminating
the parental rights of the Beckers. See Guardianship of Phillip B., 139 Cal. App. 3d 407,
412, 188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 783-84 (1983). This amounted to an unusual decision to maintain
through law multiple ties between the child and the two sets of parents. The traditional
legal approach rests on the contrasting assumption that only one set of parents can have
legal rights and responsibilities regarding a given child. Recent scholarship challenging
this assumption has offered recommendations for facilitating through law several simultaneous adult relationships with a child. See Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 886-89, 944-61 (1984) (exploring traditional notion of
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The court also credited the psychological closeness between
Phillip and the Heaths 132 and did not suggest that the Heaths'
closeness to Phillip caused them to act in their own rather than
in his interests. Instead, the opinion registered considerable sensitivity to the multiple relationships in the child's life, relationships where neither closeness nor distance could direct who
should decide the medical treatment.
Nevertheless, an extraordinary expression of concern about
closeness and distance, and objectivity and subjectivity appears
in the judge's statements about himself. Judge Fernandez included personal statements of great emotion and reflection. 133
The judge asserted that while this court has tried to remain
objective,
[j]udges are humans and not machines. From my point of
view I believe that we prefer to be judged by a real person with emotions and common sense, and all those other
important characteristics of a Homo sapien . . . . As I
read his file and I could see that this little boy was beginning on his trip towards death, and that he realized it, I
was stricken with anguish and parental grief . . . . It
may be argued that I used the footnotes too much to philosophize and state some personal views, experiences, and
anecdotes. My defense is that in a case like ours which is
so fundamental and basic to life, people should know how
some of their 'governors' think and have their opportunity to judge the judgment of the judge. 134
exclusive parenthood, challenges in current patterns of divorce and child custody, and
alternatives to exclusive parenthood); Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35
STAN. L. REV. 423, 439-48, 474-89 (1983) (discussing alternatives to permanency policy in
foster care system and reviewing psychological evidence about children's needs). The
lawyers for the Heaths constructed a theory of the case that transformed the medical
treatment decision into a custody context-and then into an innovative arrangement
shifting limited custody to the Heaths. The Beckers challenged this shift and lost. 139
Cal. App. 3d 407, 188 Cal. Rptr. 781.
132. The court did, in context, expressly chastise Phillip's parents for clinging to the
assessement they formed of him at birth. Id. at 19 & n.69. It is important to note that
the court's gesture of care and compassion towards the child may well punish others, like
parents who have chosen a different position on the medical treatment issue. Parents
may well experience a decision overruling their judgment as a serious rejection or even
humiliation, yet these experiences are inevitable when their decision fails to meet a standard of care that legal authorities will enforce.
133. See id. at 18-19 & nn.68, 68a, 70 (discussing how the case haunted the judge,
brought to the judge's mind the treatment of disabled people in other cultures, in literature, and in the judge's neighborhood).
134. Id. at 23 n.70 (emphasis added). Note how the judge placed himself within the
case-"in a case like ours." Id. It is a moving opinion, and one that pierces the usual grey
prose of official state documents. It gives both an encouraging sense of a real human
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Thus, Judge Fernandez revealed his relationship to the child
by breaking through the usual conventions of distance and anonymity to share with the public his personal moral struggle between respecting and rejecting the parents' choice. In so doing,
he exposed the decisional process as he experienced it: it implicated his relationships to the child, to the two sets of parents,
and to the general public as well.
It is an unusual opinion, in an unusual case. For the usual
frameworks for analysis that divide self-determination and
proxy determination, procedure and substance, and objectivity
and subjectivity, all appear in the opinion, and yet the opinion
itself challenges these dualities, and reaches resolution outside
their confines. Self-determination and proxy determination
would both be problematic, given the child's mental retardation
but also his evident personality and attachments to people. For
Judge Fernandez, Phillip's own views could no more be ignored
than they could themselves be determinative. Instead, the judge
constructed a dialogue form in which the judge could combine
what he had learned about the child with his best effort to imagine what the child would want, in relation to how the judge himself saw the situation. Similarly, for Judge Fernandez, the substance of the medical treatment decision could not be separated
from who should decide, nor indeed from questions about what
kind of life Phillip would face in relation to people who had contrasting conceptions of who he was. These issues appeared inextricably connected in the judge's opinion, for the kind of life
open to the child seemed to depend on which relationships he
could maintain.
Acknowledging the central importance of relationships, the
judge also acknowledged his own relationship to the child. He
made it clear that he, Judge Fernandez, was undertaking some
large share of the decisions for the child, even though the "who
decides" question allows a judge to hide behind presumptions,
precedent, and professional role. His personal involvement, and
his honesty about it exposed the limits of the standard tensions
between self-determination and determination by others, procedure and substance, and objectivity and subjectivity.
Other cases routinely express medical treatment decisions
through these dichotomies, but imply that these somehow help
being struggling with moral issues and a disturbing sense of how thin is the veneer of
laws on a justice system of men. Compare B. BRECHT, THE CAUCASIAN CHALK CIRCLE
(presenting a judge abandoning commitment to laws in favor of revealing personal dimension of justice) with R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975) (exploring how and why antislavery judges enforced slave laws despite personal commitments to the contrary).
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resolve the problem. 1311 Yet these dichotomies afford no basis for
gaining insight into fears and hopes about the child, and no
guidance for viewing how the child's relationships affect the opportunities that lie ahead. Nor do the dichotomies offer a way
for the reviewing judge to recognize his or her involvement in
and distance from the case-or the similar mix of involvement
and distance for the watching public. A series of additional procedural choices surrounding judicial review also invoke the stan~
dard dichotomies without illuminating these complicated patterns of relationships and ambivalence that surround the
medical treatment decision for a severely handicapped child.
These procedures may effectively allocate power or uncertainty
in ways that in effect produce resolutions in particular cases, but
they still fail to unearth, much less address, the deeper conflicts
about relationships between handicapped persons and others
that animate controversies over these cases. An examination of
review procedure, burdens of proof and presumptions thus can
reveal the persistence of the familiar dichotomies-and the persistent patterns of distrust that remain to divide people over
these controversies.
3. Review procedures- The state makes additional procedural choices in determining the methods of review available if
someone wants to challenge a parental decision, and in assigning
burdens of proof and presumptions in cases involving such challenges. Real consequences flow from these procedural choices in
terms of the duration and costs of the medical care decision, and
also in terms of the ultimate allocation of decisional power.
First, the state establishes the availability of review of a parental decision concerning the medical care of their child.
Should the state permit some other relatives, hospital personnel,
or strangers to challenge that decision? 136 Should the state encourage or require such challenges, by establishing a board to
135. Compare, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) (contrasting assumptions about effect of professional and parental proximity to child in making a civil commitment decision) and In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (finding that
the close bond between parent and child justifies entrusting parent with medical treatment decision) with In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970), aff'd, 37
A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d
686 (1972) (holding that even religious belief of parent cannot support refusal of medical
care; state must protect the child).
136. The state should decline to recognize challenges brought by persons unrelated
by family or professional contact to the instant case; although doctrines of standing permit variable recognition by the judiciary of claims, C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 59-74 (1983); one generally cannot assert the rights of another, id. at 73. If the
rights of the infant are at stake, the state itself should represent them. See supra text
accompanying note 15.

Journal of Law Reform

984

[VOL. 18:4

review whatever decision the parents make? Answers to these
questions have made consultation with a medical ethics committee routine in some states. 137
Federal regulations have also stimulated the use of hospital
ethics committees. 138 Such committees initially gather information about the particular health of and treatment options for the
infant, and then draw upon the interdisciplinary knowledge of
the doctors, nurses, theologians, philosophers, social workers,
and lay people on the committee to decide the proper medical
care for the infant. 139 An advantage of such committees is their
collaborative structure, in contrast to the adversarial format of a
judicial proceeding. A disadvantage-shared by judicial review-is the time the committee process may take, forcing in1

137. Boisen, supra note 107, at 17. In the Quinlan case, the court required use of the
hospital ethics committee as a check on the doctors' assessment that there was no reasonable chance of the patient's recovery. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Other courts have similarly relied on-and thereby encouraged the use of-ethics committees. E.g., In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn.
1984); see Longino, supra note 78, at 402-03 (discussing ethics committees).
138. See Boisen, supra note 107, at 19. The American Academy of Pediatrics supported the use of such committees in response to the proposed Baby Doe regulations.
The proposed regulations provided guidelines for Infant Care Review Committees
(ICRCs) to:
develop policies and guidelines for the treatment of such infants; act as ~ resource to hospital personnel and families of disabled infants to provide current
and complete information concerning medical treatment, procedures and resources as well as community resources; and review decisions made in individual
cases to assure that appropriate treatment is provided. Where medically indicated treatment is not being provided, the ICRC will report such a case to the
[state child protective service] agency for immediate legal intervention.
45 C.F.R. § 1340.14. The final regulation clarified that the guidelines concerning these
committees are purely advisory and no federal carrots or sticks would induce their adoption. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,880, 14,896. Nonetheless, these advisory guidelines continue to provide a detailed model for such committees that combines information, resource, and referral with mechanisms to report cases to court or state child protective services. Id. at
14,896. And the Department of Health and Human Services encourages the formation of
such committees. Id. at 14,893. Although no particular substantive effect need follow
from the use of such committees, the federal policy statement regarding the committees
reaffirms the committment of the Department of Health and Human Services to promote
institutional practices with a guiding principle "to prevent the withholding of medically
indicated treatment from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions." Id. at
14,898.
139. Procedural ambiguity arises over who should sit on the committee, when and at
whose instigations cases should be sent to the committee, and how weighty a committee
decision should be. See Robertson, supra note 87. The advisory guidelines issued by the
federal government recommend inclusion of: a practicing physician, a practicing nurse, a
hospital administrator, a social worker, a representative of a disability group, a lay community member, and a member of the facility's medical staff. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,893-94.
The guidelines also recommend procedures for review of specific cases, including appointment of a member of the committee as an advocate for the infant, and procedures
for referring a case to court or to state child protective services. Id. at 14,896. Each of
these features recapitulates issues about who should decide the merits and how.
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terim treatment decisions and prolonging parents' agony. Indeed, prolonging the decision may force one decision over
another in many cases. For example, time delays may require
treatment to preserve the infant's life pending a committee review, or postpone treatment pending an appeal of a committee's
decision reversing parental choice.
Substantively, rationales for committees' judgments are as
problematic as for parents' judgments. No societal consensus exists about these issues; the lack of consensus explains why these
cases reach ethics committees. Additionally, no consensus exists
about what ethical principles should guide the committees' decisions. 14° Committees may simply approve the decision reached
by parents and doctors, which makes the committee process
seem redundant. Indeed if this is the result, the committee
structure may simply provide a procedural evasion of the substantive issues. The procedural decision to create a committee
itself represents a choice to disturb the traditional legal arrangement that allocates power to parents, subject to the review only
by a state social service agency or court. The committee process
injects a new set of decisionmakers as a seeming answer to the
troubling procedural problem of who should decide these cases.
It only seems an answer because if committees reverse the parents' and doctors' decisions, these people may pursue judicial review, thereby further extending the decisional process, 141 and reopening the question of who should decide. The reviewing court
then would have to consider whether the parents' proximity to
the problem disqualifies them from judgment, or instead privileges their position. Similarly, the court could consider who can
provide the most reliable proxy decision, given the impossibility
of self-determination for the disabled infant. Whatever substantive decision produced by the committee process and judicial review, the review committees do not provide any way for parents
or the larger community to develop understandings about types
140. See R. VEATCH, CASE STUDIES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 40-41 (1977) (noting that clergyman, judge, utilitarian, formalist each have special expertise). Veatch maintains that
in an egalitarian society, debates about right and wrong in such situations express the
values and epistemology of democracy. Id. Deciding whose values should prevail in medical ethics, then, raises the same problems as debates over values in the larger society:
problems for debate, not deference to higher authority or special expertise.
141. The state also could use the threat of malpractice charges should doctors fail to
pursue medical treatment and thus encourage the doctors to seek state approval if they
accede in a parental decision to forego treatment. Such a risk of malpractice charges
would draw doctors into a search for administrative or judicial review. Both the ultimate
decision by the committee and the standards for malpractice for the medical personnel
directly draw the process back into the substantive debate over treatment. Rather than
bypassing substance, these procedural choices depend on it.
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of handicaps and treatment options, or about how parents and
the community itself are implicated in the meaning of the infant's disability and opportunities in the future. Instead, the
committee process could play into tendencies to distrust the
parents, and to force decisions into an adversarial mode.
"
One procedural alternative to the current review process
would assign to committees the task of developing working
guidelines for treatment based on diagnostic categories. 142 This
alternative would address the confusion, inconsistency, and secrecy of treatment decisions by giving guidelines to parents and
doctors, without exacerbating the difficult decisional process at
the moment that they must make a treatment decision for a particular infant. Another alternative would place the parents on
the review committee rather than treat them as witnesses or
parties before it. This would give others a chance to talk with
the parents in a context where the parents do not turn into defendants but also do not remain inviolate decisionmakers. ua Finally, a third alternative would modify the methods of ethics
committees. Ethics professionals would not make or review the
treatment decision but would help the parents and doctors make
that decision in light of the range of concerns that an ethics
committee would deem important. 144 Such an approach could
challenge parents' overestimations or underestimations of the infant's quality of life, while also helping parents clarify their assessments of the relationship between their interests and the
child's interests.
Adopting any of these alternatives, however, involves a judgment to assign the treatment decision, as a rule, to the parents
in consultation with their doctors, rather than to the committee
itself. This central judgment returns to the "who decides" ques142. Cf. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 210-11 (recommending treatment decisons based
on diagnostic categories); see also Hentoff, The Awful Privacy of Baby Doe, supra note
4, at 54-55 (distinguishing treatment options by diagnostic category). See infra text accompanying notes 185-88 (proposing procedures to develop guidelines outside of the context of any pending case).
143. This alternative might be impractical for decisions that must be made shortly
after the child's birth, when both mother and father may be physically and emotionally
incapacitated. Yet even at this point, greater access to good information about the child's
condition and prospects could help the parents and the decisions they and/or the doctors
make. See infra text accompanying notes 176-83 (proposing nonadversarial exchange of
information).
144. Malcolm, Medicine, Law and the American Way of Death, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30,
1984, § 4, at 7, col. 2, (hospital ethics committes that "don't actually make life-and-death
decisions" but "dispatch individual members to meet with doctors, patients and family
to insure specific treatment decisions are made in an ethical context" for chronically ill
patients).
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tion, and the state's task in resolving this question remains difficult, given reasons to distrust all available decisionmakers. Indeed, the issue of parental bias due to their closeness to the
situation is a major basis for the committee review process. If
the committtee is created to alter the usual allocation of power
between parents and state, it leaves judicial review as the avenue
for parents to reassert their view-to reopen the questions of
who should decide, and what should be decided.
Issues about who should decide centrally recur in the state's
procedural choices of burdens of proof and presumptions, with
or without a review committee. For instance, should the law assign a presumption in favor of any parental decision and impose
a burden of proof on the state or any challengers to rebut this
presumption? 1 • 11 These procedural choices determine the routine
handling of cases, and also what will happen in an unusual case,
given doubt about the merits. The usual rule grants a presumption that parents act in their children's interests. 146 A legal
framework in which parents are presumptive caretakers for their
children casts any person who would challenge the parents' decision in the role of the accuser, and the parents in the role of
defendants charged with violating the trust bestowed upon them
by the state. Frequent challenges in practice, and institutional
procedures like ethics review committees that second-guess the
parents' decisions, erode a presumption for the parents simply
by subjecting their decisions to review. 147
The state's choices about review procedures, burdens of proof,
and presumptions also revive substantive issues and debates
concerning self-determination versus proxy decision making,
closeness, and distance. Given the impossibility of self-determination by the handicapped infant, the state's choice of the
proper nature and standard of review reflects trust and distrust
of the family and the state. The conception of the family as an
145. Variations in the formulation of the presumption are also possible. Compare In
re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1984) (requiring clear and convincing evidence that child
suffers from irreversible defect in order to sustain parental decision to withhold treatment) with In re Becker, 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801-02, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1978) (declaring that the state has serious burden to overcome presumption of parental autonomy), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
146. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Application of Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699,
702, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965, 988 (1979); see also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, supra
note 43, at 19-21, 91-109 (proposing standards restraining state supervention of parental
decision-making power over child's medical treatment).
147. Of course, the presumption may serve the additional purpose of tilting the case.
toward the parents' decision once review is underway, but even this function of the presumption may be undermined if review committees structure their process routinely as
evaluating anew the parents' medical treatment decision.
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enclave of love and selflessness removed from the untrustworthy
power of the state supports arguments for allowing parents to
make the medical care decision and for restricting the kinds and
numbers of challenges and review by others. The contrasting
conception of the family as a dangerous, unbridled area of discretion and the state as the source of law and justice supports
substitute decisionmakers and vigorous review by the state.
Each version expresses distrust of one set of authority figures
and greater trust for another.
Debates over cases like Baby Jane Doe's embroil the affected
family and the watching community in a drama of blame and
defense. The frameworks for analysis, cast in terms of substantive versus procedural choices, and state intervention versus
nonintervention, merely permit people to enact their distrust
rather than to acknowledge it. When abstract principles and dichotomous concepts structure debate, impassioned, rigid and polarized stances can emerge, as in the abortion debate. Such debates obscure the complexity of the connections between state
and family, between the value of life and the relationships that
give it value, and between procedural and substantive decisions
on these matters. Abstract and dichotomous debate also occludes the ambivalence and distrust that can fuel controversy.
Especially when forged in the crucible of adversarial processes,
debates over medical treatment for handicapped newborns actually impede our recognition of and confrontation with the
sources of emotional conflict that animate public fascination
with the state's decisions in cases like that of Baby Jane Doe.
This article has suggested thus far, in marginal ways, how this
fascination may be linked to people's conflicting experiences of
being moved and repelled by the plight of the infant, just as it
has suggested how the meaning of life for a handicapped person-or, indeed, any person-depends importantly on the relationships others are willing to undertake. Unusual moments-like Judge Fernandez's decision in the case of Phillip
Becker-offer profound insights into this deeper level of understanding. There a judge was able to acknowledge the real difference particular relationships could make in the child's life, and
the judge also acknowledged the complexity of his own relationship with the child before the court. Yet these powerful effects
of interpersonal relationships, and the significant role of emotional conflict, barely surface for express acknowledgment in the
usual legal and policy debates over individual cases or the issue
in general.
Rather than confining these matters to the corners of concern,
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the next Section of this article proposes to address these issues
directly. I will start with the theme of distrust, as a thread interwoven in public debates that hints at deeper conflicts, usually
obscured by those very debates. The next Section thus asks,
what conditions give rise to this distrust?

III.

CONDITIONS OF DISTRUST AND CONDITIONS FOR TRUST

Distrust reverberates in the state intervention debate and in
tensions between both substantive and procedural options concerning medical care for disabled infants. Arguments over the
merits of state intervention in the family in part express competing views about whether the state or the family is more trustworthy in caring for handicapped newborns. Similar conceptions
animate debates concerning who should serve as the presumptive decisionmaker and whose interests do not conflict with the
interests of the infant. Yet explaining distrust by reference to
these conceptions affords little insight or suggestion for change.
To understand the sources of distrust, analysis must plunge
deeper than these debates. These debates depend upon abstract
conceptions of the state and the family. And these abstractions
oversimplify what is at stake while tapping deep sources of
distrust.
Use of the "state" as a concept in the debate over intervention
oversimplifies, because the state is not one entity but instead
sets of institutions, employees, and rules subject to interpretation. The "state intervention" in the Baby Jane Doe case involved half a dozen judges, many administrators and investigators, and several hundred legislators. Each of these individuals
had a different relationship to the situation, a point obscured in
the press and public debate by general expressions of trust or
distrust of state action.14 8 Similarly, the "family" is not one entity but a multitude of unique interpersonal relationships bound
by complicated mixtures of biology, culture, love, and dependence, and threatened by complicated internal and external
pressures. It is too crude to assign genuine feelings of trust or
distrust to the abstracted concept of "family."
Yet the attribution of serious concerns to abstract concepts
typifies legal and policy analysis. The tendency to translate com148. There may be a basis to distrust the state due to the very numbers of persons
involved when the state acts. This marks a different point from a general statement of
distrust of the state, compared with the family.
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plicated emotional dimensions of the medical care decision into
the choice between oversimplified, competing concepts recurs
when observers box the medical care decision into procedural
and substantive categories, and the substance of the decisiQn
into the extreme alternatives of right to life and quality of life
assessments. Such alternatives provide a rhetorical structure for
debating what should happen, but it is a thin and limited rhetoric that obscures the ambiguity and line-drawing problems that
arise with each substantive alternative. Similarly, casting procedural choices among decisionmakers, review mechanisms, and
burdens of proof provides outlets for debate but offers little insight into continuing disagreements.
A.

Distrust and Identification

I propose to examine deeper sources of disagreement than the
abstract alternatives of state versus family, right to life versus
quality of life, and procedure versus substance. This inquiry
may help uncover what rivets public attention to cases like that
of Baby Jane Doe, and also may open a new and more promising
arena for attention. Informed by work in psychology and philosophy, this inquiry will consider: (1) how might experiences of
identification with Baby Doe, her parents, and others explain
people's responses to the case; (2) how might the mass media
coverage and the adversary system contribute to ambivalent and
yet condemnatory responses to aspects of the case; and (3) how
might psychological theories about the self illuminate sources of
distrust in debates about the case.
1. Objects of identification- The Baby Jane Doe case and
similar tragedies capture the attention of the general public because almost all members of society can identify with one or
more of the principal figures in such cases. 149 This identification
occurs on three levels.
First, people may identify with the vulnerable infant. Every149. For discussions of the psychological concept of identification, see J. GREENBERG
& S. MITCHELL, OBJECT RELATIONS IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY 70-72, 160-61, 171, 331
(1983) (discussing internalization of aspects of others as developmental dimension; the
authors are object-relations theorists); J. KAGAN, THE NATURE OF THE CHILD 139-43
(1984) (discussing the process by which a child develops identification with distinctive
qualities of others, and constructs standards of behavior on the basis of this identification). I am using the term more generally to apply to the self-recognition adults as well
as children may feel in perceiving the roles and attitudes of others; I mean to refer to the
psychological notion that the individual's self-conception and repressed internalization
of others is implicated by experiences of identification.
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one has been an infant once, and everyone in that capacity has
dealt from a position of vulnerability with powerful adults who
make decisions for the child. Identification with the infant may
exist unconsciously and subtly; it may also be intense and disturbing. It may be intense because childhood vulnerability may
undergird adult memory and identity. 1110 It may be disturbing
because identification with the vulnerable infant does not itself
help an adult know which choice about medical care to prefer
even though the identification makes the choice itself seem terribly important.
Identification with the infant may support aggressive medical
care and elaborate methods to preserve or prolong life, but it
may also encourage more conservative treatment. An adult identifying with the disabled infant may imagine desires on the part
of the child to live, to receive all possible care, and to gain assurances of attention and comfort. Yet an adult identifying with
the infant might as easily prefer suicide to extensive medical
treatment that cannot ameliorate the underlying handicapping
conditions. Or such an adult may imagine wanting to relieve
family members from the burden of caring for a severely disabled child. The adult may also imagine living inert and unloved
in an institution, which might produce strong desires for treatment, but also strong desires for nontreatment. Indeed, whether
the competing choices about medical treatment seem in equipoise or yield a preference, an adult identifying with an infant
may well distrust anyone else to know and understand what the
infant needs. 1111
At the same time, an adult can also identify with the parents
of a handicapped infant. This identification may horrify the
adult, for it can involve feeling both revulsion at having given
150. Many theorists assert that the child's early life may be characterized by vulnerability and helplessness, see J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, supra note 43, at 7-10,
and that these experiences remain in the individual's psychic world even during adulthood; H. FINGARETrE, THE SELF IN TRANSFORMATION: PSYCHOANALYSIS, PHILOSOPHY AND
THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT 59 (1963); M. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOP·
MENT, AND DEATH 104-05, 150 (1975). See generally J. GREENBERG & S. MITCHELL, supra
note 149, at 105 (describing Harry Stack Sullivan's notion of foresight as anticipation of
future interactions conforming to past experience, with the past shaping the anticipation); id. at 373 (discussing Joseph Sandler's theory of internalized representations compiling past experiences and perceptions that allow the individual to locate the present).
151. See A. MILLER, THE DRAMA OF THE GIFTED CHILD (1983) (describing parents imposing their desires on children); A. MILLER, THOU SHALT NOT BE AwARE 7-8, 31-36
(1984) (adults and psychoanalysis denying abuse of children by parents, ignoring patients' signals); see also R. BURT, supra note 103, at 13-44 (1979) (reporting that reasons
to distrust both patient and doctors grow from their mutual impact on each other, stemming from basic psychological construction of self and others).

992

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 18:4

birth to a handicapped newborn and revulsion at this revulsion.
An adult identifying with the parents of Baby Jane Doe may
discover both an inclination to abandon the child and disgust
with that inclination. The identifying adult may also feel drawn
by a moral view of duty to resolve this emotional turmoil by renouncing instinct in favor of conscience. 1112
Just as the emotional response may be deeply ambivalent, any
duty the adult constructs from identification with the infant's
parents may support opposite courses of action. For example, a
duty of care, extrapolated from the role of parent, may command consent to all measures to preserve or prolong the child's
life. Yet that same duty may also direct attention to the dignity
of that child, including an entitlement to die with dignity. Identification with the parents' emotional ambivalence and role obligations provides bases for distrusting those parents, because the
identifying adult discovers through his or her identification a basis to distrust himself or herself. 1113
Finally, some people may also identify with the medical and
legal personnel and this too may produce ambivalence. They
may feel drawn by medical personnel's commitment to preserve
life. On the other hand, people may imagine and resent medical
professionals' technological fix 11H or tendency to use all new
152. See S. FREUD, C1VILIZATION AND ITS D1scoNTENTS PART VII, 793-96 (1930) (J. Riviere trans.), in THE MAJOR WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD (W. Benton ed. 1952)(describing
conscience emerging from renunciation of instinct); S. FREUD, AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 42-43, 56-57 (J. Strachey, trans. 1949) (theorizing that the ego must fight internal instinctual demands and external pressures); J. KAGAN, supra note 149, at 143-53
(arguing that moral standards subjugate dispositions in monitoring human behavior and
rewarding self with sense of goodness).
153. Moreover, observers may identify with both infant and adult and experience a
conflict like the tension between the quality of life position and the right to life position.
Advocates of a quality of life standard may focus on the risks of imposing pain or joyless
existence on the helpless infant. They fear that someday the child they save will wish not
to be alive, or will be incapable of expressing or even formulating that wish. They may
also worry about the burdens to the family-the marriage, the other children-who will
have to care for this infant with little or no financial or emotional assistance from the
state. The right to life advocates in contrast fear that attempts to draw lines between
different qualities of life devalue life, and start down a slippery slope where no one's life
is assured value and protection. Some ignore or deem irrelevant the burdens to the family from raising a severely disabled child, some assume institutional care will be available, and a few argue for societal commitments to assist the family by improving the
services for and social status of disabled people. See supra text accompanying notes 6162 and infra text accompanying note 171.
154. See Boisen, supra note 107, at 17 (reporting hospitals' bias toward technological
intervention); see also R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 30 (describing neonatal intensive care
centers and technological sophistication of tertiary care hospitals). The fact that tertiary
care hospitals are not the only place where babies are born poses problems of inequitable
access to resources, which also influence the range of treatment options for infants. Thus,
using "all available" methods means something different in different institutions.
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techniques available to save life rather than estimate the sense
or value of the procedure. 11111 People may identify with a judge
and feel the isolation of that role.
Furthermore, people who identify with the adult actors in the
case have reason to distrust them, because they have reasons to
distrust themselves. And people who identify in any way with
the infant have reasons to distrust others, because they have
memories of learning that no one could know their needs completely. However these feelings of trust and distrust arise, and
however people deal with these feelings, a story like the case of
Baby Jane Doe engages individuals' own senses of vulnerability,
self-loathing, and aspirations for wisdom-much as medieval
morality plays engaged their audiences. 1116 The case of Baby
Jane Doe may thus expose people's fears about their own vulnerability to the power of others. The case may also invoke fears
about betraying a sense of duty with emotional responses, and
also fears about cutting off emotional impulses with a sense of
duty.
The case may at the same time nurture hopes for resolution of
these fears. 1117 People may view the parents as good or evil, and
similarly evaluate the state. But in any case, the story itself may
capture their own self-distrust and distrust of others, while offering an occasion for judgment. In judging parents, doctors, and
other decisionmakers in this context, a watching public audience
risks projecting self-distrust onto any of these actors. Observers
may also project onto others one side of their ambivalent feelings, such as the fear of emotional impulses, while waiting ready
to condemn those others based on the contrasting side of ambivalence, such as the fear of cutting off emotional impulses
through a sense of duty. One observer may blame parents for
underestimating the value of the life of the severely disabled
child; another may blame the parents for clutching at technology
155. The practice of "defensive" medicine, in the face of malpractice risks or other
worries, may lead medical personnel to use whatever techniques are available. See R.
WEIR, supra note 61, at 138. But see Longino, supra note 78, at 401-02 (describing physicians torn between their own moral judgments and desires to remove burden from
parents).
156. See F. ARTZ, THE MIND OF THE MIDDLE AGES 359-60 (rev. 3d ed. 1980) (reporting
that medieval morality plays used actors to represent virtues and vices and other abstractions; usual theme had evil forces pursue Everyman and Wisdom rescue him); see
also M. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW: A THEOLOGICAL HUMANISTIC VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS 42-59 (1981) (contrasting law's and theatre's techniques for redirecting passion and comparing trials and morality plays).
157. Cf. R. BURT, supra note 103, at 55, 65, 134 (arguing that interaction between
patient and doctors reveals power and powerlessness of both, and opportunity for continuing struggle for choice making).
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only to prolong the process of the child's death. Both the adversarial structure of legal proceedings, and the media's tendency to
cast news events as moral tales with good and evil figures exacerbate this risk of mutual blame and projected self-distrust, and
deserve fuller consideration.
2. Fomenting distrust- The media news coverage gives the
story of decisions about medical treatment for a handicapped
newborn a sense of crisis even as it may prolong, through each
daily update, the ambivalence and conflict people may feel
about each alternative.m Nonetheless, mass media attention has
severe limitations as a vehicle to resolve or accomodate these
fears. Media coverage focuses longstanding emotions on a crisis,
and plays into desires for ad hoc judgments rather than for
working solutions amid acknowledged complexity. A dramatic
presentation of legal and medical debate does not address the
relationships where vulnerability arises but merely attracts the
feelings those relationships generate. Distrust relates to fears
about how people treat others who are vulnerable. The media
portrays the treatment of the vulnerable but does not elevate to
express discussion the feelings this treatment may arouse. Moreover, the media presentation fails to emphasize the relationship
between the witnesses and the witnessed. The presentation fails
to reveal that the future meaning of the life of the handicapped
person depends in part on the meaning the watching society
gives to the handicap-that the offering or withholding of help
expresses as much about the helper as it does about the helped.
The public audience in these cases, then, in a real sense, are
related to and involved in the drama. Perhaps because the
drama involves the universally familiar subject of family
life-and the double vulnerability of a handicapped child-the
audience identifies even more powerfully than they do in other
public dramas, like those involving terrorists or trapped coal
miners. In addition, there may be a special fascination with the
communities' own power and powerlessness to alter the meaning
of disabilities. Our attitudes about particular handicaps, about
parents of handicapped children, and our priorities for medical
expenditure construct the moral and social universe in which
handicapped infants and their parents live.
Yet these dimensions of interrelationship remain obscured by
158. In a sense, readers of the unfolding news story are like the audience watching
tragic drama. As Stanley Cavell describes, tragedy occurs in a continuous present demanding attention and immobilizing the audience which can do nothing but witness.
Cavell, supra note 104, at 314, 322, 329-30.
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the adversarial character of the legal drama that the media publicizes. Adversarial decision making may heighten the conflict
over a case like Baby Jane Doe's, and feed rather than resolve
the sources of distrust. lli9 Indeed, administrative and judicial review of parental medical care decisions for handicapped
newborns may reenact and refuel exchanges of distrust. Hospital
review committees, even with their internal collaborative structure, may establish adversarial relations between hospital and
parents, and parents and child. The media's tendency to cast
villains and heros, combined with the adversarial posture of legal and administrative decision making, conveys the ways the
players are opponents and strangers, and submerges the ways in
which they-and we-are connected to one another.
3. The relationship between self and other- Each of these
dimensions-the adversarial structure, the public audience observing a distant but enthralling media drama, the possible identification by many people with the relationships between vulnerable infants and more powerful adults-exposes a psychological
issue about the relationship between self and other. Is the self
separate from others-free from their power, abandoned to care
for itself? Or is the self connected to others-receiving care but
also subjected to oppression? 160 Some elements of the debate reflect the first view, some the second. The notion of the separate
and isolated self underlies adversarial problem-solving, where
opponents perceive each other as separate and antagonistic.
Similarly, the sense of an audience removed from the actors in a
drama, and the infant with interests at odds with her parents,
depends upon the view of the self as separate· and open to harm
from others. Each of these conceptions has an either/or structure, dichotomous like the duality of self and other. To some
extent, psychologists offer support for this view of the self. They
159. See K. SCHNEIDER & M. SCHNEIDER, DIVORCE MEDIATION 23-30 (1984) (critiquing
of adversary system's winner-take-all approach, exacerbation of conflicts, bitterness, hostility, and misunderstandings). But see J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw? 124-37
(1983) (noting that alternatives to adversary system also give cause for distrust).
160. These themes have occupied some recent legal scholarship. See R. UNGER, PASSION 20-21 (1984); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO
L. REV. 205, 211-13 (1979); Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 11-15, 20-26
(1984); see also Weinreb, The Complete Idea of Justice, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 757, 799-800
(1984) (arguing that a notion of self develops through interaction with environment; relationships to others important in construction of self and in diminution of se!O. These
themes also figure prominently in psychological works, see C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE (1982); Benjamin, The Oedipal Riddle: Authority, Autonomy, and the New Narcissism, in AUTHORITY IN AMERICA 195 (1981), and in political and social theory, see M.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 179-83 (1982); R. SENNETI', AUTHORITY 2740, 84-88, 116-21 (1981).
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tell us that the child develops a sense of self by seeing parents,
and all others, as separate. 161
Yet these theorists also emphasize that even this development
of a separate self depends on the child's relationships with
others to discover and delineate a boundary between self and
other. 162 Moreover, some theorists maintain that the individual
self is more than a bounded separate identity. Instead, the person continually negotiates an identity in relationship with
others, with varying degrees of dependence and interdependence, distance and closeness. 163 These theorists suggest that the
individual depends on others in the very creation of a sense of
self, and this dependence persists even in the process of separating, emotionally and cognitively, from others. The development
of a sense of personal boundaries-where the self ends-in this
sense is entwined with continuing awareness of where others begin. Finally, the self may continue to depend on experiences
with others that become internalized as part of the individual's
sense of self. These notions of the self, forged in ongoing relationships, support a view of inevitable, interpersonal connection,
attended by risks of domination but also opportunities for mutual care.
This excursion into psychology suggests that debates over the
medical treatment of an infant like Baby Jane Doe may raise
intense and complicated psychological aspects of the relationship between the self and others. A limited notion of self as separate may underlie and animate the issues of trust and distrust
as expressed in the varied dichotomous debates over state intervention, substance and procedure, quality of life and right to
life. A richer sense of the interdependent self may highlight
ways in which these dichotomies are misleading-for a right to
life depends on relationships that can give it meaning, procedure
and substance intertwine, and the state cannot avoid intervening
in the family it defines and regulates-just as the self depends
161. See J. GREENBERG & S. MITCHELL, supra note 149, at 274-81, 345-46 (describing
Margaret Mahler's and Edith Jacobson's theories of individuation and selO.
162. Id.; see also N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978) (reports
that male and female children both construct gender identity in relationship to mother);
D.W. Winnicott, Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child Development, in CHILD,
PLAYING AND REALITY 30-138 (1971) (reporting that the child needs to see mother seeing
him to develop sense of selO.
163. See R. KEGAN, THE EVOLVING SELF 73-110 (1982) (synthesizing work of Piaget,
Kohlberg, Loevinger, Maslow, McClelland, Murray, and Erikson). See generally R. BURT,
supra note 103, at 97-99 (criticizing static view of a priori selves; self as more fluctuating,
oscillating; and challenging paradigm of autonomy); N. NoDDJNGS, CARING: A FEMININE
APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION 40-49 (1984) (reporting that the self learns
to care for self by caring for others and being cared for by others).
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on others in establishing boundaries, integrity, and internalized
identity. At the same time, knowing that the self depends on
others even in its separateness and that another may betray you
out of care as well as out of unconcern, a healthy individual may
experience conflicting desires for both separation and interdependence. People may distrust both state officials and parents as
"others" adverse to the child's interests, and yet appreciate both
as the sources of support. From this complicated posture it is
easy to find grounds to distrust anyone's claim to be acting in
the interests of the child. Efforts to acknowledge the relationship between the adults and the child-and the interaction between their interests-may eliminate fears of undisclosed conflict, but only by disclosing the possibility of actual conflict. 16"
Thinking about problems in either/or terms fits neatly into
the psychological problem of constructing a self in relationship
to others; and yet the either/or terms may hide the very bases of
relationships between the alternatives, and among those affected. 1611 Thus, the adversary structure may overemphasize sep164. Reasoning with a focus on relationships between individuals has been a concern
for feminist theorists. See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 160; N. NooDINGS, supra note 163. An
interesting parallel occurs in the approach advanced by pragmatists like William James,
whose thinking, according to Jacques Barzun, is:
held fast by as many demands and duties as the moral agent can think of. His
relativism relates, which means many links to fixed points . . . . In thus relating
one's decision or conduct to several needs and ideals, one gives the observer as
many chances to criticize, whereas the absolutist relates his act to only one
thing: the fine abstraction that his God or his grandfather once uttered
emphatically.
J. BARZUN, A STROLL WITH WILLIAM JAMES 156 (1983). See w. JAMES, PRAGMATISM AND
THE MEANING OF TRUTH 32-39 (1975) (theorizing that ideas are true insofar as they help
us reach satisfactory relations with experience). See also Rorty, Pragmatism, Relativism,
and Irrationalism, in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 160, 165 (1982) (noting that pragmatism rejects notion of constraints by objects; constraints come only in conversation
with other people).
165. Legal categories themselves may be thought of as dichotomous choices; a given
problem either fits in a legal category or it does not. Interpretation problems arise but
can be solved by reference to the purposes of the categories. See E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 18-27, 29-54 (1962). Yet there are many serious critics of this
approach to legal problem solving. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE Jumc1AL PROCESS 46-47 (1921); J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 8-13, 62-74, 127-58 (6th ed.
1970); L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF LAW 8-18 (1968); L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 106-51,
266-334 (1969); G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 14-16, 68-98 (1977); K. LLEWLLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 62-157, 178-91 (1960). In a recent opinion, Judge Bork
wrote for the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit:
The temptation to adhere to sharply-defined categories is understandable.
Judges generalize, they articulate concepts, they enunciate such things as fourfactor frameworks, three-pronged tests, and two-tiered analyses in an effort,
laudable by and large, to bring order to a universe of unruly happenings and to
give guidance for the future to themselves and others. But it is certain that life
will bring up cases whose facts simply cannot be handled by purely verbal for-
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aration and antagonism while obscuring commonality and mutual need. The public drama may exaggerate the separation of
the audience from the anguish of the actors. Conceptions of the
vulnerable infant may underestimate the vulnerability of the
adults to the infant, and the interdependence of interests. The
conception of decision making as a task to be completed alone
may exaggerate a need for separation and undervalue a need for
consultation. And the tendency to carve problems into rigid dichotomies between the self and others, substance and procedure,
intervention and nonintervention, may emerge from psychic preoccupations only partially understood.
I· offer these views in the belief that greater efforts to understand such psychic preoccupations can free us from simply enacting them. Where those preoccupations give rise to distrust in
matters of public policy, such efforts at understanding may be
the only way to escape polarized, rigid debates. Distrust, unexamined, cannot be cabined. Attributing it to an abstraction, like
the family or state, simply preserves it; assuaging it with procedural solutions leaves its sources unexplored. 166 An alternative
approach to a case like that of Baby Jane Doe would break out
of the ill-fitting dichotomies of state and family, objective and
subjective, substance and procedure, and instead work for conditions of trust. The principal premise behind this approach would
assert that trust cannot be announced, but must be achieved.
Just as the self develops through struggles with others for both
separation and connection, the foundations for trust must grow
through human encounters and public struggles over the meaning we give to the fact of our shared humanity. Pursuing conditions for trust, I offer the following suggestions to attend to disputes in cases like Baby Jane Doe.

B.

Conditions for Trust

Media and legal attention to cases like Baby Jane Doe will
probably continue for some time, given these conditions of unmulas, or at least not handled with any sophistication and feeling for the underlying values at stake. When such a case appears and a court attempts nevertheless to force the old construct upon the new situation, the result is mechanical
jurisprudence.
Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
166. Cf. Gabel, Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1563, 1572-81 (1984) (describing alienation and false self
linked to rights consciousness).
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certainty and distrust, and little said in this article or elsewhere
can change these conditions. No new substantive rule, procedural technique, or new position on the state intervention debate will promote trust between people concerning this subject
that so invokes personal vulnerabilities. New medical knowledge
and changes in the social meaning of various handicapping conditions may partially address the current uncertainty that undermines settled expectations. Over time new rules may well secure public confidence through new routines that recede into the
background of settled expectations much like the old routines,
where parents or doctors quietly made decisions about infant
medical treatment with the tacit or express endorsement of legal
and community authority. 167 Such developments seem distant
now, however, largely because distrust and controversy in this
area are increasing, not abating. The debates over state intervention, right to life versus quality of life, and procedural alternatives themselves express dimensions of distrust between people-distrust that runs deeper than the particular medical
treatment decisions at issue. Addressing the conditions of distrust themselves may open the way for new routines to gain wide
acceptability for dealing with medical treatment decisions for
handicapped newborns. Because sharp disagreements are bound
to persist, these routines will chiefly involve ways of channeling
disagreement away from simplistic, adversarial alternatives, and
toward contextual discussions that address what really could
and should happen in the lives of disabled newborns. Such discussions require at minimum the kind of trusting relations that
allow people to move beyond polarized, rigid positions, and simplistic conceptions of their opponent's positions. Achieving this
kind of trust will require encounters, conversations, and confrontations between people in ways that will make vivid the
shared condition of humanness and vulnerability. 168
167. See infra note 182 and text accompanying note 184. New routines could-and
should-involve careful and difficult efforts to think through individual cases not general
rules. See R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 139.
168. Sociologists and anthropologists who study the conditions of trust in varied societies emphasize the role of exchange in the development of interpersonal relations. See S.
EISENSTADT & L. RoNIGER, PATRONS, CLIENTS AND FRIENDS: INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS
AND THE STRUCTURE OF TRUST IN SocIETY 29-42 (1984) (discussing work of John Bowlby,
George Homans, Peter Blau, Claude Levi-Strauss, Emile Durkheim, and Michael
Mauss). One variant on exchange as a basis for trust is conversation-the exchange of
words-as a basis for trust. In contemporary scholarship, the prevalence of "conversation" and "dialogue" as models for moral and political discourse is striking, especially
because these models are adopted by authors who represent a range of views on other
matters; see also T. TODOROV, MIKHAIL BAKHTIN: THE DIALOGICAL PRINCIPLE 60-74 (W.
Godzich trans. 1984) (theorizing that every utterance is related to every other utterance;
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The first step in building conditions for trust occurs simply by
asking what state decisions about medical care for handicapped
infants would promote trust in the processes and results. How
can a decision about the medical treatment of a handicapped
newborn avoid the assignment of blame by people who disagree
with the decision? How can parents, medical personnel, and
others appreciate the great degree to which they share the problem, and ambivalences about it, rather than only the degree to
which they desire different medical care for the infant? How can
each of these actors note how each has a relationship with the
infant, and how these relationships will deeply influence
whatever future awaits the child? These questions differ from
the usual frameworks for debating medical care for handicapped
newborns by rejecting questions that ask for either/or answers
and by expressly addressing the objective of acknowledging ambivalence while promoting actual care for the child, whatever the
medical treatment decision. Asking such questions represents a
gesture toward commonality and an effort to resist antagonistic
problem solving. Asking such questions embraces the paradox
that opponents share their controversy, and the fearful self
shares with other persons the psychic construction of self and
other. Embarking on this inquiry expresses a small act of trust
and permits a glimpse of how the problem would change if we
viewed all the actors involved, the parents, the infant, the medical personnel, and the legal officials, as standing on the same
side rather than on opposing sides. Posing trust as part of the
agenda will not cause it to emerge. But turning public attention
requiring study of dialogical relations in all texts). Compare Habermas, Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence, 2 RECENT Soc. 134, 146 (H. Dreitzel ed. 1970) with
B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 4, 10 (1984). The Supreme Court itself
has expressed a notion of due process as a conversation-and both as representing fairness. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Court ruled that due process requires an
informal hearing in the form of a conversation before suspending a student from public
schools. The Court reasoned that this requirement is, "if anything, less than a fairminded school principal would impose upon himself in order to avoid unfair suspensions"-and the Court concluded that the procedural requirement would permit the student to give his version of the facts and allow the school official to respond.
A commitment to conversation-or any participatory process resembling it-is not a
neutral stance, at least from the vantage point of anyone who would rather not participate. Cf. W. ARNEY, POWER AND THE PROFESSION OF OBSTETRICS 240-42 (1982) (noting
that the one freedom currently unavailable to pregnant women is the freedom to remain
unseen, unmonitored by the obstetrical system). Yet in a democracy, public knowledge of
important decisions is central to the commitment to decentralized power. See Bazelon,
Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 823-25,
824-32 (1977). Acknowledging that the commitment to conversation embraced in this
article is not neutral, I support it in part as a way to check the power of parents, doctors,
and the state officials who make treatment decisions for handicapped newborns.
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to this issue could help establish a context in which the needs of
the infant and the family involved can be addressed rather than
deployed in a public drama of blame and controversy.
1. Addressing the relationship betweeen treatment decisions and care-taking responsibilities- Several elements of
public debate cast distrust on the parents as ultimate decisionmakers for their child. The conception of the family as a
center of law]ess oppression and domination of the powerless by
the powerful depicts the parents as untrustworthy. Similarly,
quality of life arguments raise suspicions about the parents who
may have their own quality of life at heart rather than the
child's when they make their treatment decision. Grounds for
distrust may increase with the claim that the parents' own
stance toward the child deeply affects that child's potential
quality of life because that quality depends on the quality of
interpersonal interactions. Further, the premise that the parents
have a conflict of interest because they are too close to the child
implies that those who will bear the burden and benefits of caring for the child should be disqualified from making the medical
treatment decision. Parents might want to avoid the financial
and emotional burdens of caring for a disabled child and therefore their possible opposition to aggressive medical treatment
could be distrusted as self-interested.
These kinds of claims in the public debate play into the adversarial mode of problem solving by suggesting grounds to distrust parental decisions and grounds for state supervision of
medical treatment for disabled infants. 169 This line of thought
fails to disclose analogous reasons for distrusting the state. The
state, as well as the family, runs the risk of insensitivity to the
needs of the child, and also risks underestimating the quality of
the child's life. A serious form of state insensitivity appears in
the unrealistic and abstract legal analysis that addresses the
medical treatment decision disconnected from other issues about
the child's future. State decisionmakers, or hospital review committees permitted by the state to second-guess parental choices,
may assume that the parents will continue to care for the infant
at home, while the parents may assume that they will ultimately
send the child to an institution. Whether the parents or the
state have the final word on the medical treatment decision, and
whether or not that decision directs treatment, the severely
169. These sources of distrust seem to lie behind the movement for hospital ethics
committees to review infant care decisions. Such committees could serve more constructive roles in sharing information with parents, rather than judging parental decisions.
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handicapped child faces a possible destiny in a poorly maintained and staffed institution. 170 These issues-and the child's
ultimate destination-are obscured by the usual frameworks of
analysis because the questions about state intervention, right to
life versus quality of life, and who should decide, all neglect the
relationships between the infant and those who will care for him
or her. The usual analysis fails to address this matter of care
even when the state itself may become the caretaker with its
own conflicting interests. The state's own goals include protecting life and reducing budgets. These goals pose a conflict that
makes the state no less free from bias and conflicting interests
than the parents. Analysis that focuses chiefly on reasons to distrust the parents' medical treatment decision fails to expose
similar reasons to distrust the state.
Policy makers committed to building trust rather than distrust should strive for an understanding that both the parents
and the state can inspire distrust, and both share responsibility
for the child that can be abused. Acknowledgment of the responsibilities both parents and the state have for children in need
could usefully focus public debate on the relationship between
the medical treatment decision and the ongoing caretaking the
child requires, whatever medical steps are pursued. Rather than
disqualifying parents from the decisional process because they
bear the burden of caring for the child, we should develop decisional processes that emphasize the state's obligations for the
child's future care. Although state officials and members of hospital ethics review committees may not personally feel responsibility for the child's future care, they should feel responsibility
for that child's future if they exercise institutional power to affect that future. To make these institutional responsibilities palpable, treatment decisions made by actors other than the parents should carry with them the financial support to pay for that
medical treatment, and to assist the parents or others who end
up caring for the child. 171 This approach resembles the proposal
that the state should not conclude a medical care decision for a
child while refusing to assume responsibility for the subsequent
170. See D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 15-44 (1984) (describing scandal-ridden institution for the mentally retarded).
171. This·solution might mean that the state would undertake a cost/benefit analysis,
and decide to discontinue treatment because of cost reasons. Yet the same risk currently
arises in less explicit ways when the state countenances cost/benefit decisions made by
parents or hospitals. Making the basis of the decision more explicit will enable broader
public debate, and improve chances that solutions will be chosen rather than merely
tacitly accepted. But see G. CALABRESI, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978) (noting the use of subterfuge to allow society to accept painful cost/benefit decisions).
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costs of the child's medical care. 172 The joint responsibility suggested here builds on this proposal by connecting decisional authority with subsequent responsibilities for the child, and by directing the state to alleviate the financial and emotional burdens
on the parents that may bias their decision. 173 The parents' conflict of interest then will present no greater problem than the
conflict for the state or the ethics committee, because each decisionmaker will have future caretaking responsibilities. 174
This approach calls for identifying the large problem that the
parents, the state, the public, and the disabled infant share: how
can the patterns of relationships and care among all these actors
acknowledge the infant as someone deserving to live and die
with dignity? This is a problem that is larger than the medical
treatment decision alone. The problem reaches the t.reatment of
handicapped people in a society not constructed with them in
mind. For example, child-care and job arrangements make caring for a severely handicapped child a difficult task for parents.
See, e.g., Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE
(1982) at 169:
If society insists through law that such children, indeed any children, receive
medical treatment rejected by the parents, the state should provide the special
financial, physical, and psychological resources essential to making real for the
child it 'saves' the value it prefers. The state should become fully responsible for
making 'unwanted' children 'wanted' ones.
173. The parents' financial burden, for example, could be extreme when medical and
legal costs are both involved. See Rankin, The Staggering Cost of Baby Fae, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 9, 1984, at Fll, col. 1 (discussing costs not covered by insurance).
174. Determining exactly what rules should govern the availability of state financial
support for the medical treatment and care of a disabled child poses a complicated task.
If the state reimbursement is available only when the state supersedes a parental decision to forego medical treatment for the child, there is a risk that parents will deliberately refuse treatment in the belief that the state will displace their judgment and then
pay the costs. Cf. DoNZELOT, THE POLICING OF FAMILIES (1979). Taking seriously the risk
of a perverse incentive means attributing considerable instrumental thought to parents
at the moment of a significant and often urgent decision about their child, and yet such
consequences of governmental rules should not be overlooked. At the same time, developing some contrasting set of criteria for state reimbursement will be difficult. Should
state payment apply to treatment for all disabled newborns, or only treatments that
would not be futile or inhumane, or only treatments where the quality of the child's life
meets some state-defined requisite standard? The reimbursement program will expose
once again the tensions behind the treatment decision itself. In addition, equity
problems arise given the large numbers of persons in other age groups who face considerable medical costs. The elderly are an obvious group with analogous needs. Perhaps the
state should promote the development of private insurance programs to cover the medical costs for disabled newborns as a way of avoiding some of the equity problems that
accompany a program of direct state subsidies. Here another problem arises: third-party
reimbursement will require yet another set of criteria for eligibility, and may also pose
cost containment issues for the medical system generally. All of these problems require
serious study and debate. Yet they remain hidden from view as long as the medical treatment decision alone remains as the focus for debate.
172.
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The problem also includes the state and private institutions that
at best offer less to the child than a home with individuals who
love the child, and at worst offer neglect and degradation. This
large problem is the proper framework for the issues of state intervention, right to life versus quality of life, and procedures for
medical treatment decision making, for it connects the treatment decision with the issues of care for the handicapped infant.
Within this framework, other alternatives could appear such as
state-provided homemaker support for the parents, or state-facilitated adoption connecting the child with a family willing to
provide care in their home for someone with severe handicaps.
Developing such options would engage state and private actors
in comprehensive planning and struggles to reallocate funds to
address this large problem.
Within the institutional structures currently in place, no single set of decisionmakers may feel able to engage in such comprehensive planning and resource allocation. In part, then, I offer this analysis as a way to highlight how limited the medical
treatment decision is, given the range of issues implicated in it.
Greater humility about the scope of issues left unresolved after
the medical treatment decision is made might help alleviate the
blaming and defensiveness that accompany review of parents'
decisions by hospital review committees or courts. In addition,
more modest activities could contribute to larger reforms. For
example, people who wish to improve the parents' decision and
help them better provide care for their child could develop and
distribute information to parents about the next or final destination of the child and about the full array of alternatives for caring for the child. 1711 This call for information relates to a second
suggestion for structuring conditions for trust, the sharing of information among actors involved in the medical treatment decision for disabled infants.
2. Sharing information- Parents, doctors, and representatives of the state should have opportunities to exchange information and to discover in nonadversarial settings whether competing sets of information support or challenge assumptions
about the infant's prognosis, the risks of various decisions, and
the trustworthiness of potential decisionmakers. 176 Intense de175. The infant's family may not now know what it can offer the child, and it may
wisely demand room for flexibility to respond to shifts in the stamina and emotional
resources of the parents and siblings. Such a demand can be made explicit, and help
eliminate the falsely idealized or falsely underestimated family response.
176. The amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act and the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Reform Act of 1978 provide for information and

SUMMER

1985)

Beyond State Intervention

1005

bate in the Baby Jane Doe case-and in the Phillip Becker
case-concentrated in part on clashing estimates of the meaning
of the child's medical condition both in terms of quality of life
and proximity to death. 177 Conflicting estimates of the child's
medical condition became entrenched by the time the parents,
the doctors, and state decisionmakers assumed formal roles and
defended their positions in a context of distrust. 178 Shared information may have alleviated some needless confrontation.
Although gathering information may pose difficulties for the
parents immediately after the child's birth, the hospital or state
could operate a clearinghouse and channel information from
medical associations, organizations for the rights of the handicapped, and groups committed to research and support for spina
bifida, Down's syndrome, and other disabling conditions to parents and their doctors. The specific means for exchange are less
important than the practice of exchanging information in a
nonadversarial context, free from assigned blame or judgment
against alternatives to be considered by the parents and
doctors. 179
educational programs to improve services to disabled infants with life-threatening conditions. See H.R. REP. No. 1038, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2947, 2951. The advisory rules issued by the Department of
Health and Human Services under the amendments elaborate model guidelines for infant review committees that would provide for this information exchange. 50 Fed. Reg.
14,893-94 (1985). But since these model guidelines also direct the same committees to
develop treatment policies, id., to work to facilitate coordination with the law enforcement activities of the state child protective service system, id. at 14,895, and to review
specific cases and refer some to court or to the state child protective services agency, id.
at 14,895-96, this model undermines the chances for nonadversarial exchanges of information for families facing a medical treatment decision. I propose instead a separation of
these functions, as described infra note 179 and accompanying text.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8 and 126-28.
178. See Baer, supra note 7, at 35-38 (describing conflicting estimates of baby's disabilities and suffering). Yet as adversarial decision making occurs, individuals may be unable psychologically to reevaluate their assessment of the child. The Beckers may have
felt a need to defend the position they had taken at the time of Phillip's birth and as a
result they may have been unable to conceive of the child differently from their first
impression. See Becker & Becker, Mourning the Loss of a Son, NEWSWEEK, May 30,
1983, at 17 (defending their position in the case and objecting to the state's
involvement).
179. The role for Infant Care Review Committees contemplated by the federal regulations suggests a problem in this respect. The committees are to be entrusted with both
the task of gathering and sharing information with parents, and the job of reporting
cases to state child protective agencies for legal action. See supra note 176. This enforcement function means that such committees would become unlikely settings for parental
trust. The committee's role in sharing information could be problematic because there
may simply be no time; the parents may face an immediate medical care decision at the
moment of birth. Yet even in these situations, decision points down the line would look
different to parents who have access to a richer array of information, especially information from parents who have undergone similar experiences. As an alternative to the com-
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Exchanged information should address the medical treatment
options and the range of possible capacities and abilities that
the child could develop. Information about the child's potential
personal development could challenge parental and medical attitudes about handicaps and also disclose how contingent the
child's quality of life may be in relation to the opportunities parents and society provide. 180 Information of this sort exchanged
before the parents reach their decision could make a difference,
unlike the effect of information exchanged in an adversarial setting. The adversarial posture rests on and promotes distrust. 181
Others have extolled the value of the adversary process to prevent indecision, to require public decision, and to promote consistent decisions. 182 I suggest that these concerns are less important values than working to promote trust in disputes regarding
the care and treatment of disabled infants. Parties must earn
one another's trust; and it is more likely earned in settings
where parties can safely share information. 183 Ethics review
panels and courts may still review a decision reached by the parents and their doctors, but the review may accord greater trust
to initial decisionmakers who have extensive information prior
to such review.
3. Drawing public attention to rule making- Over time,
rules and routines, like common law developments, emerge from
crisis decisions with case-by-case review. 184 To facilitate this
mittees described in the regulations, states could have parents consult with professionals
who could help the parents make their own decision, based on a broad range of information and serious moral inquiry. This alternative could help parents deal with the problem in response to social concerns without altering the usual presumption of parental
choice. See supra text accompanying note 144.
180. See, e.g., D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, supra note 170, at 112, 122, 177-79
(describing a struggle for community placements for handicapped people). See generally
text accompanying notes 90-93 (meaning of handicaps partially contingent on social
response).
181. See supra text accompanying note 159; see also Nader & Todd, Jr., Introduction, in THE DISPUTING PROCESS: LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES 1, 17-40 (1978) (noting that
strangers who have disputes typically have imbalance of power, exacerbated by professionals, and distance of law from community culture).
182. Baron, Medicine and Human Rights: Emerging Substantive Standards and
Procedural Protections for Medical Decision Making Within the American Family, 17
FAM. L.Q. 1, 20-23 (1983).
183. Counselors trained to help parents deal with their feelings while sorting through
the information would also improve the decisional process.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 167-68. This notion is the familiar explanation of legal change that displaced an earlier notion that the law consisted of eternal and
unchanging principles from which just applications could be deduced. See B. CARDOZO,
supra note 165, at 23-28, 99; G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 97-103 (1974); C.
REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: THE EVOLUTION OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM 43-48 (1980). At
work in this currently dominant idea of legal change is a conception of authoritative
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process, and to draw public attention away from private family
pain, hospitals and states could engage in a form of rule making
to set temporary and mutable treatment guidelines based on diagnostic categories. 1811 As medical knowledge and social attitudes
constructing the meaning of a given handicap change-and
change more quickly in some communities than others-public
debate about prospective treatment decisions could accomplish
the purposes of education and participatory decision making.
The social meaning of Down's syndrome, for example, has
changed over the past several decades.1 86 Consequently, states
could develop guidelines stipulating that the deprivation of
medical treatment solely because an individual has Down's syndrome is an action triggering judicial review.
Any general rules would incorporate values and social attitudes as well as medical information. Moreover, medical professionals, political authorities, and lay citizens should share in this
rule making process before individual cases capture public attention. Thus, prospective rules and standards should emerge
through public debate, whether in reaction to a state rule making process or through a citizens' advisory review of hospital
guidelines. Advocacy groups for people with various handicapcommunities-like judges-whose interpretations can develop a set of conventions for
given periods of time. Cf. Fish, Interpretation and the Pluralistic Vision, 60 TEx. L.
REV. 495, 498-99 (1982) (finding that community of meaning establishes conventions to
interpret texts). But see Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEx. L. REV. 527 (1982)
(noting that interpreters make meaning by exploring the purpose of the enterprise); Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982) (reporting that legal interpretation,
even seen as interpretation of texts, repeats fragmented discourse that fractures society).
Also at work here is a powerful assumption that law evolves, that is, that the changes in
law point in a direction and that this direction brings improvement and progress. See
Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 CoLUM. L. REV. 38, 55-59
(1985) (discussing Corbin and others). Cf. R. NISBET, HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
297-316 (1970) (noting that the notion of progress in history is linked to theories of organic evolution and carrying optimism for future).
Without embracing either an idea of change as progress, or an idea of conventional
interpretations as immutable, I do suggest that routines for handling problems can
emerge from debate and can assist individuals and society in negotiating problematic
and painful experiences. It is also possible to develop rituals of self-reflection to accompany decision making shared by clients and professionals; see D. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE
PRACTITIONER 295-325 (1983); using such routines of practice involves a continuing process of submitting to and challenging the apparent consensus; see M. PoLANYl, PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE 207-09 (1962).
185. See R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 210. Ellis proposes legislative guidelines to make
the treatment decisions more predictable and in accord with community values. Ellis,
Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 393 (1982). Although I
agree with his advocacy of a legislative process to express public values-and his acknowledgment that consensus will be impossible-I find less compelling his emphasis on
testimony by medical experts and his concern for the integrity of the medical profession.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 126-32 (discussing In re Phillip B.).
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ping conditions could use such debates to educate the public. 187
Working guidelines could emerge, but the prospect of ongoing
conflict should not be understated. The point of the proposed
process for public debate is not that some noncontroversial consensus will emerge, but that a process promoting genuine argument would be better than the current combination of mediahyped morality plays and drawn-out legal proceedings.
Even working guidelines emerging from public debate still
would inevitably give rise to conflict, and occasions where parents, physicians, and public observers distrust one another. In
areas unresolved by diagnostic and treatment guidelines, hospital review committees could be shaped to provide nonadversarial
settings where medical and nonmedical personnel could contribute to the decision. Including parents as participants in the discussions would be a worthwhile experiment, even if they and the
other committee members share mutual distrust.
These proposals for public rule making and nonadversarial
hospital review committees suggest incremental steps by which
methods of problem solving could teach us more about who we
are and how and why we mistrust one another. Trust in a democracy comes not through announcement by the powerful but
rather through continuing conversations between people who
both need and fear each other. 188 In a related context, Dr. Jay
Katz has argued that doctors and their patients can remedy
their mutual distrust through conversations and sharing of information and decisional authority. He suggests that physicians
must first face the limits of their own professional knowledge,
and acknowledge their distrust of themselves, in order to learn
to trust their patients and share authority with them. 189 Similarly, medical professionals, legal authorities, media commentators, and parents need to acknowledge their distrust of themselves in order to resist projecting that distrust onto others when
difficult decisions arise concerning the medical treatment of a
handicapped newborn. As Dr. Katz concludes, such a climate of
trusted decision making "cannot be implemented by judicial,
legislative, or administrative orders. At best, such outside interventions can prod doctors; at worst they only substitute bureau187. See Biklen & Ferguson, supra note 4, at 8 (comparing views of Down's syndrome
of Congress, Spina Bifida Association of America, and American Academy of Pediatrics).
188. See Kann, Consent and Authority in America, in THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY
IN AMERICA 59, 66-67, 76-79 (1981) (discussing tradition of consent of the governed and
shared decision making, jeopardized by centralized power and withheld information).
189. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 102-03, 228-29 (1984).

SUMMER

1985)

Beyond State Intervention

1009

cratic authority for professional authority." 190 Similarly, neither
external authorities nor public enactments of private ambivalence can attend to the sources of distrust that fuel public debate and fascination with medical treatment decisions for severely disabled infants. Instead, a process of education, selfexamination, and genuine controversy provides the best hope for
building the kind of trusting relations where real disagreements
can be acknowledged and worked through.
CONCLUSION

Medical treatment decisions for severely handicapped
newborns have become public cause celebres as well as private
crises. In an important sense, this article is about the limits of
law in dealing with these situations. The problems explored here
cannot be resolved by lawsuits, statutes, or regulations, for these
legal vehicles replay the ambivalence that underlies our fascination with and perplexity over medical treatment for severely disabled newborns. 191 The public debate has focused on arguments
for and against state intervention, with a tendency to treat these
alternatives as dichotomous. Similar polarized claims gather
under the banners of two substantive principles, the right to life,
and the right to make medical choices based on assessments of
the quality of life. Adversarial themes permeate disputes over
who should decide these cases, who should review such decisions, and what presumptions and burdens of proof should govern. Such disputes carry an intense emotional charge, because
almost all members of society can identify with one or more of
the principal figures in cases like Baby Jane Doe's. This identification hardly resolves the issues, and instead may occasion the
projection onto public debate of deep sources of distrust and
self-distrust located within individual psyches. The very pattern
190. Id. at 228.
191. Federalizing or constitutionalizing the law in this area seems especially unwise,
given these deep-seated feelings on contrasting sides, and given the ambiguous and
quickly changing medical understandings about infants with severe deformities or handicaps. See supra note 24 (criticizing application of § 504 to these cases). Yet I do not
believe that law should-or could-be cordoned off from any involvement here, just as
state intervention in the family cannot be avoided once there is a backdrop of state
regulation of the family. In this regard, legal settings could strengthen efforts in administrative and counseling settings to confront the ambivalence and interpersonal relationships implicated in these medical treatment decisions. Law in this sense is no special
source of answers but neither is it disqualified as one of the possible terrains where enduring human dilemmas can be acknowledged.
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of either/or problem-solving that underlies the debates over
state intervention, right to life versus quality of life principles,
and procedural techniques to give or deny power to parents may
be rooted within the psychological development of individual
identity where the self stands in contrast to the other. 102
This article has argued, however, that the either/or notions in
each of these contexts fail to capture the variety and inter-relationships of the concepts and practices they represent. Thus, the
article has argued that the debate over state intervention, when
couched in either/or terms, neglects both the variety of meanings state intervention has in practice, and the ubiquity of state
involvement in family relations. Similarly, the article has argued
that the polarized substantive debate between advocates of a
right to life principle and advocates of a quality of life principle
neglects the line-drawing problems each engage in, and the dependence of both principles on procedural issues. At the same
192. This analysis has been influenced by developments in psychological theory that
explore the interconnection between the individual's self and others in the very construction of a sense of personal identity. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
These works reject a simple dichotomy of self and other by showing the interrelation of
both, much as other work in psychology explores the relationships between therapist and
client through the shared symbolism of language. See M. EDELSON, THE IDEA OF A
MENTAL ILLNESS 105-36 (1971); R. KEGAN, THE EVOLVING SELF 76-110 (1982). This article
also draws on emerging work in philosophy, which challenges the traditional Cartesian
distinctions between subjectivity and objectivity and explores the relationship between
the two through the significance of shared, human enterprises, like language, that have
qualities of both. See R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTMSM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 71-108 (1983); R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM xiii-xliv,
160-75, 191-208 (1982); see also S. CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON: WITTGENSTEIN, SKEPTICISM, MORALITY, AND TRAGEDY (1979) (exploring the meaning of Wittgenstein's work for
philosophic problem of other minds and for moral philosophy); H. GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (D. Linge trans. 1976) (containing essays exploring the phenomenon
of understanding through the conditions that constitute it and lie beyond conscious or
obvious meanings). Similar developments in other fields emphasize the process of interpretation that relates the reader to the text rather than other theories of knowledge that
separate the knower and the known. See T. EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (1983) (presenting theories about literature); D. LACAPRA, HISTORY & CRITICISM
(1985) (presenting intellectual and social history); see also R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W.
SULLIVAN, A. SWINDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDMDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985) (adopting an interpretive approach to social science study
of American culture). These efforts in quite varied fields all mark an important challenge
to traditional ways of understanding by searching for how our ways of knowing constitute what we know and who we are. Such enterprises can be criticized as self-absorbed
and as spending too much time challenging conventions and canons within existing disciplines rather than addressing their supposed subjects. Yet these efforts also hold promise
of richer kinds of knowledge that may free us from puzzles and problems that have been
a function of the very intellectual approaches to analysis that have been used in the past.
See R. RoRTY, supra, at xuvii-xlv. It is in this spirit that this article has tried to probe
beneath the prevailing patterns of argument to ask why we talk about problems the way
we do, and how focusing on our relationship to these problems may provide a vantage
point that breaks free from approaches that have not been especially fruitful in the past.
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time, the division of problem solving into substantive and procedural concerns underestimates the interpenetration of these two
sets of concerns. Finally, although the very notion of a "self'
distinct from an "other" may supply a psychological root for the
either/or patterns of problem solving, and trust and distrust, the
"self and other" construct should be located within a developmental process in which each individual develops a separate self
only in relation to others.
And yet the patterns of either/or problem solving obscure and
impede recognition of these very psychological dimensions of
public and private responses to the situation of the handicapped
newborn. Ambivalence about feeling both moved and repelled by
the handicapped newborn propels adversarial debate, and the
debate itself fails to help people acknowledge this ambivalence,
much less the role of the community in the life opportunities
available to any handicapped person. The persistence of the dichotomous formulations of problems cannot be due to difficulties in pointing out how oversimplified and unsophisticated they
are. Intellectual assaults on crude absolutist positions can be
readily forged, and can handily win superficial victories. In debate over these matters, it is not too difficult to obtain a concession, such as: "state intervention is not a yes or no proposition,"
or even, "the right to life position at some point has to draw a
line." And yet beyond such concessions, there is a structure of
talk that sticks. Crude versions of the problem as a contest between either/or alternatives remain and largely frame the debate
among key public officials as well as in the media and popular
discussion.
These debates express genuine differences between those who
prefer to emphasize the right to life without regard to quality or
cost and those who in contrast focus on quality and cost questions. Similarly, some people express strong commitments to
combating anything that looks like state imposed restrictions on
parental decision making, and others as adamantly call for aggressive state activity to review or challenge what parents decide
about treatment for a severely handicapped child facing serious
medical problems. Further, people who feel strongly on both
sides of these issues have seized the instruments and categories
of legal analysis and taken their disagreements to legislative and
judicial forums at both the federal and state level.
Finally, genuine conflict persists in these legal contexts. People still conflict over medical treatment decisions for handicapped newborns and on these occasions they may win or lose.
In particular, parents, and those identifying with them, lose if
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they choose a position that so underestimates the life chances
for the .infant that others can demonstrate to the satisfaction of
legal authorities that this estimate amounts to illegal neglect. Although this very notion of neglect will remain contestable in
many cases, some parents will lose, or feel forced to a position in
order to avoid legal battle. The same will hold for doctors and
legal decisionmakers. Similarly, strangers to families with severely impaired newborns lose because they cannot gain legal
power to stop parents from sometimes making a decision against
possible medical treatment; such strangers experience this result
as an assault on their deeply held beliefs. Thus, conflicts over
where to draw the line between condemnable neglect and acceptable decisions will be fought with real winners and losers.
In this light, it may seem impossible to conceive of parents,
doctors, legal decisionmakers, and the severely disabled infant as
standing on the same side of the medical treatment problem. Indeed, the debate over medical treatment for disabled newborns
risks becoming as polarized and rigid as the debate over abortion. Yet I have suggested that the very pattern of distrust that
underlies these debates offers a starting point of commonality
for all participants in these debates. Hovering between tragedy,
where choice and human will play a role, and pathos, where
human pain constitutes the story, everyone who deals with the
infant treatment decision shares the inability to remove the infant's disability along with the power to affect the meaning of
disability in this society. And everyone shares the lack of knowledge of the infant's interests and the risk of distrusting others'
assessments of those interests.
This article has suggested that starting with what we share,
even if it is simply our mutual distrust, affords a promising approach to resolving medical treatment problems, or at least engaging in more productive forms of disagreement. Asking what
we share can also reveal opportunities for sharing information,
sharing responsibility for the meanings society gives to disability, and strengthening the relationships between the infant and
those who will care for him or her.
Both as ways to promote these kinds of understandings, and
as initial steps we could take based on these insights, this article
proposes processes for decision making that (1) underscore the
obHgations of both state and family in the care for the infant,
whether or not medical treatment is authorized; (2) provide for
exchanges of information in nonadversarial settings to improve
the parents' and other parties' understandings of the medical
condition and the ways in which the meaning of that condition
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can change over time, partly in light of how the child's caretakers respond; and (3) develop settings where guidelines about
treatment can be debated, removed from crisis situations, and
assisted by the participation of medical professionals, political
authorities, and members of the public. Unlike the infant care
review committees currently under development, these proposals
separate the exchange of information and the development of
policy from law enforcement activities against individual parents
and from the heat of particular controversies. In addition, these
proposals call for building within the decisional processes we use
acknowledgment of the ambivalences and tensions aroused by
these medical treatment decisions, and recognition of the way
these emotional responses express our relationships with one another. Thus, these proposals call for less adversarial and more
constructive processes. The proposals also prefer local, contextual approaches in specific cases over abstract debate over principles. At the same time, the article urges serious efforts to devise policies about the continuing needs of handicapped people
rather than the largely symbolic struggles over treatment decisions about handicapped newborns. Over specific cases and
broader policies, we will still disagree, yet we may learn to understand how our disagreements show what we share. One important basis even opponents share is our complicated relationships to the handicapped person, and indeed, to others engaged
in the debate.
The vantage point afforded by our relationships with one another here offers an important corrective to the perspective that
focuses on our separateness. Most important, however, are efforts to keep in view both angles of vision, for our ambivalence
about wanting to feel connected and also wanting to feel separate is especially pronounced in relation to a severely handicapped person, who can inspire a sense of recognition and connection but also feelings of revulsion and separation. This very
focus on our relationship with a handicapped infant may illuminate how our wanting that infant to disappear is part of our relationship with him or her. Yet the relationship also invites care
and sense of connection. This article has described the possible
forms such ambivalence may take as an effort to acknowledge
what underlies legal responses to and public fascination with
cases like Baby Jane Doe's. Bringing this ambivalence to the
surface as an express subject for public debate will not eliminate
it, but neither will ignoring it. Addressing such ambivalence can
allow deeper understanding of the shortcomings of prevailing solutions, which often appear to take rigid and polarized alterna-
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tives. Talking about the ambivalence behind these alternatives is
at least a way to gain freedom from the ignorance about what
may propel debate. And acknowledging ambivalence about the
severely handicapped child could help people understand why
they may oscillate between feeling that this could be my
child-and this has nothing to do with me. A similar understanding could emerge about the real possibilities that the
meanings of various handicaps can change, given changes in the
opportunities and resources society makes available to the handicapped-but also an understanding that actual people with terribly difficult burdens are involved.
Although the steps proposed by this article are small and incremental, they stem from this diagnosis of the deep, psychological sources of debate over cases like Baby Jane Doe's. Taking
steps that incorporate an understanding of the deep sources of
dispute will not end the dispute, but may lead to more productive ways of disputing. Embarked on these routes, we may successfully turn our fascination with other people's tragedies into
commitments to share vulnerabilities and strengths.

